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ARTICLE
COLORBLIND CAPTURE
JONATHAN P. FEINGOLD*

ABSTRACT
We are facing two converging waves of racial retrenchment. The first, which
arose following the Civil Rights Movement, is nearing a legal milestone. This
term, the Supreme Court is poised to prohibit affirmative action in higher
education. When it does, the Court will cement decades of conservative
jurisprudence that has systematically eroded the right to remedy racial
inequality. The second wave is more recent but no less significant. Following
2020’s global uprising for racial justice, right-wing forces launched a
coordinated assault on antiracism. This campaign has enjoyed early success. As
one measure, Republican Party (“GOP”) officials have passed, proposed, or
prefiled hundreds of bills designed to stymie antiracist discourse, activism, and
organizing. To process this moment, scholars have highlighted patterns of racial
retrenchment past and present. This includes decades of right-wing efforts to
deny the relevance of race and racism in America following the fall of Jim Crow.
These accounts are not wrong, but they obscure a key variable that has enabled
racial backlash: the Left. Specifically, privileged voices on the Left continue to
rehearse colorblind conceptions of race and racism—even while defending
race-conscious reform. I term this phenomenon colorblind capture. To illustrate
its ubiquity and impact, I explore decades of affirmative action litigation. This
analysis reveals an underappreciated trend. Even as the Left champions
affirmative action, the Right sets the terms of debate. This includes the Left’s
pervasive reflex to defend affirmative action as a “racial preference.” This
framing is neither inevitable nor strategic. The Left could, for example, defend
race-consciousness as essential antidiscrimination—that is, a modest tool to
mitigate existing racial (dis)advantage and, thereby, yield a more
individualized, objective, and race-neutral process. But as the cases before for
*
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the Supreme Court reveal, Harvard and the University of North Carolina
(“UNC”) continue to rehearse right-wing talking points—even as they defend
their own admissions policies. Colorblindness, albeit a creature of the Right,
has captured the Left.
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INTRODUCTION
We are facing two converging waves of racial retrenchment in the United
States.1 The first, which arose following the Civil Rights Movement, is nearing
a legal milestone. This term, the Supreme Court is poised to prohibit raceconscious2 university admissions.3 When this occurs, the Court will cement a
decades-long campaign to defuse antidiscrimination law’s liberatory promise
and potential.4
The second wave is more recent but no less significant. In 2020, George
Floyd’s viral murder catalyzed a global uprising for racial justice.5 In its wake,
individuals and entities across the nation embraced antiracism as a framework
to guide our collective racial reckoning.6 This antiracist turn signaled a
commitment to racial justice unseen since the Civil Rights Movement. It also
triggered near-immediate backlash. Then President Trump, mired in his
slumping reelection campaign, focused on antiracism—among other targets like
Critical Race Theory (“CRT”) and the 1619 Project—as a potent foil.7 From

1

See generally Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988)
(observing that moments of racial progress are followed by backlash and retrenchment of the
preceding racial quo).
2
Within this Article, I employ the term race-conscious to describe policies that permit
decision makers to consider the racial identity of individual applicants. This differs from raceattentive, which I use to describe policies that are attentive to racial outcomes but prohibit
decision makers from considering the racial identity of individual applicants. Within this
Article, I refer often to affirmative action—a term that encompasses a range of race-conscious
and race-attentive practices. Unless stated otherwise, affirmative action refers to raceconscious policies as defined above.
3
See Greg Stohr, Supreme Court to Consider Banning Race in College Admissions (1),
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 24, 2022, 10:42 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/supreme-court-to-weigh-banning-use-of-race-in-college-admissions
[https://perma.cc/RZY4-GPJM].
4
See Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 989 (2007) (noting that colorblindness “has been
firmly read into the Fourteenth Amendment”).
5
See Jason Silverstein, The Global Impact of George Floyd: How Black Lives Matter
Protests Shaped Movements Around the World, CBS NEWS (June 4, 2021, 7:39 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/george-floyd-black-lives-matter-impact/
[https://perma.cc/T2DX-5VHG].
6
See Will Jones, 1 Year After Murder of George Floyd, Anti-Racism Workshops Are Still
in
High
Demand,
ABC
7
EYEWITNESS
NEWS
(May
24,
2021),
https://abc7chicago.com/george-floyd-murder-death-anti-racism-workshop/10689146/
[https://perma.cc/3ZUK-VELU].
7
See What Trump Is Saying About 1619 Project, Teaching U.S. History, PBS NEWS HOUR
(Sept. 17, 2020, 6:20 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/what-trump-is-saying-about1619-project-teaching-u-s-history [https://perma.cc/Y8X9-9TLA].
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Tweet to Executive Order, the former president ridiculed antiracism as “child
abuse,” “a sickness,” “toxic propaganda,” “offensive,” and “anti-American.”8
At the time, Trump’s broadside garnered limited national attention. That
disinterest has proven misplaced. A once-isolated attack metastasized into a
nationwide campaign9 of regressive discourse, legislation, and intimidation.10
One sees this trend in the proliferation of rhetoric that demonizes antiracism as
the new (antiwhite) racism.11 Across the country, GOP officials have
weaponized anti-antiracism rhetoric to justify an ever-growing host of laws

8
Exec. Order No. 13950, 85 Fed. Reg. 60683, 60683 (Sept. 22, 2020) (characterizing
Executive Order as necessary to “promote unity in the Federal workforce, and to combat
offensive and anti-American race and sex stereotyping and scapegoating”); Memorandum
from Russell Vought, Director, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Sept. 4, 2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/M-20-34.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7UU2-JQPT] (directing all agencies to identify and cancel “all contracts or
other agency spending related to any training on ‘critical race theory,’ ‘white privilege,’ or
any other training or propaganda effort that teaches or suggests either (1) that the United
States is an inherently racist or evil country, or (2) that any race or ethnicity is inherently racist
or evil”); Shannon Pettypiece, Trump Calls for ‘Patriotic Education,’ Says Anti-Racism
Teachings Are ‘Child Abuse,’ NBC NEWS (Sept. 17, 2020, 5:19 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-calls-patriotic-eduction-says-antiracism-teachings-are-child-n1240372 [https://perma.cc/ML45-DVVB]; Evan Semones,
Trump Fumes over Troops Report, Amplifies Memo Against Anti-Racism Training at OMB,
POLITICO (Sept. 5, 2020, 10:39 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/05/trumpmilitary-the-atlantic-omb-report-409312 [https://perma.cc/AR47-Y6QZ].
9
A well-funded and highly coordinated network of right-wing actors continues to seed the
infrastructure, intellectual capital, and financing for this regressive campaign. Judd Legum &
Tesnim Zekeria, The Obscure Foundation Funding “Critical Race Theory” Hysteria,
POPULAR INFO. (July 13, 2021), https://popular.info/p/the-obscure-foundation-fundingcritical [https://perma.cc/T94C-QFEA] (noting that between 2017 and 2019, Thomas W.
Smith Foundation donated at least $12.75 million to twenty-one right-wing organizations that
scrutinize CRT). The Heritage Foundation constitutes one of the intellectual arms of this
movement. See Critical Race Theory, HERITAGE FOUND., https://www.heritage.org/crt
[https://perma.cc/HVB4-XH87] (last visited Oct. 25, 2022).
10
See JONATHAN FRIEDMAN & JAMES TAGER, EDUCATIONAL GAG ORDERS: LEGISLATIVE
RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM TO READ, LEARN, AND TEACH 4 (2021), https://pen.org/wpcontent/uploads/2022/02/PEN_EducationalGagOrders_01-18-22-compressed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VGE8-UPR4] (last visited Oct. 25, 2022) (“Between January and
September 2021, 24 legislatures across the United States introduced 54 separate bills intended
to restrict teaching and training in K-12 schools, higher education, and state agencies and
institutions.”).
11
See Anti-Racist Is a Code for Anti-White, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (May 3, 2022),
https://www.adl.org/education/references/hate-symbols/anti-racist-is-a-code-for-anti-white
[https://perma.cc/VUV9-V9U2] (last visited Oct. 25, 2022) (“‘Anti-Racist is a Code Word for
Anti-White’ is a racist slogan that became popular among white supremacists in the mid2000s.”).
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designed to chill12 basic conversations about race and racism in schools and
beyond.13 Closer to home, local officials have invoked similar rhetoric to
discipline or terminate educators for assigning works written by Black authors,14
proclaiming that Black Lives Matter,15 or teaching a comprehensive and honest
American history.16
This backlash shows little signs of abating.17 To the contrary, we are facing a
threat to civil rights and multiracial democracy unseen since the fall of
Reconstruction.18
12
See FRIEDMAN & TAGER, supra note 10, at 8-11 (surveying bills passed in states that ban
conversations about race and impose monetary penalties or grant private rights of action as
enforcement mechanisms).
13
See Anti-Racist Is a Code for Anti-White, supra note 11 (noting that slogan “Anti-Racist
is a Code Word for Anti-White” originated from a short essay called “The Mantra,”
popularized by white supremacist Bob Whitaker and his followers in hopes of reframing
racism); Ibram X. Kendi, The Mantra of White Supremacy, ATLANTIC (Nov. 30, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/11/white-supremacy-mantra-antiracism/620832/ (discussing how Tucker Carlson, Blake Masters, and Glenn Youngkin have
used anti-CRT rhetoric).
14
See Hannah Natanson, A White Teacher Taught White Students About White Privilege.
It Cost Him His Job, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2021, 8:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2021/12/06/tennessee-teacher-fired-criticalrace-theory/ (describing experience of high school teacher in Tennessee, Matthew Hawn, who
was fired after assigning Ta-Nehisi Coates’s essay The First White President and showing his
students poetry performed by Kyla Jenée Lacey).
15
Joe McLean, Lee High Teacher Who Hung BLM Flag Outside Classroom Reassigned,
Accused
of
Misconduct,
NEWS4JAX
(Mar.
25,
2021,
7:10
PM),
https://www.news4jax.com/news/local/2021/03/25/lee-high-teacher-who-hung-blm-flagoutside-classroom-reassigned-accused-of-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/BF6M-E862].
16
Brian Lopez, North Texas Principal Resigns to End Fight over Whether He Was
Teaching “Critical Race Theory,” TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 10, 2021, 5:00 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/11/10/colleyville-principal-critical-race-theory/
[https://perma.cc/6TPR-92FR].
17
See Jonathan Feingold, What the Public Doesn’t Get: Anti-CRT Lawmakers Are Passing
Pro-CRT
Laws,
CONVERSATION
(Nov.
30,
2021,
8:28
AM),
https://theconversation.com/what-the-public-doesnt-get-anti-crt-lawmakers-are-passing-procrt-laws-171356 [https://perma.cc/CT7Q-MTZZ] (observing that Virginia Governor-elect
Glenn Youngkin’s pledge to “ban critical race theory on Day One” and his success “cemented
CRT as a favorite foil in the Republican playbook”).
18
See Ishena Robinson, The War on Truth: Anti-CRT Mania and Book Bans Are the Latest
Tactics to Halt Racial Justice, NAACP: LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://www.naacpldf.org/criticalrace-theory-banned-books/ [https://perma.cc/PT3P-CY2V] (last visited Oct. 25, 2022)
(“Honest and accurate discussions about this country’s history, including shared knowledge
about its sordid legacy of systemic racism and the accompanying use of fearmongering and
political violence to maintain it, are key to building a more informed electorate who can make
our democracy work for all Americans. Yet the realization of a truly functioning multiracial
democracy, one in which even the most historically marginalized voices have power, is
exactly what the ongoing war on truth aims to disrupt.”).
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This Article intervenes in this moment. But rather than focus on the rightwing forces stoking racial resentment, I turn to a critical but underappreciated
source of backlash: privileged voices on the Left.19 My claim is not that actors
and institutions on the Left are consciously committed to racial retrenchment.
Rather, I argue that many on the Left defend antiracist efforts on terms that
reinforce colorblind conceptions of race.20 And, in so doing, the same
individuals and entities who celebrate antiracism imperil the legal and moral
case for race-conscious policies.
On the surface, the Right and Left embrace competing theories of race and
racism in America. Albeit reductionist, one can capture this divergence as
follows: the Right says race no longer matters; the Left says it does. This split
can be seen as a contest between colorblindness and colorconsciousness.
Colorblindness, at its core, reduces race to an otherwise arbitrary physical
attribute and situates racism in an ignoble past. Colorconsciousness, in contrast,
embraces a structuralist frame that locates racism within American society
itself—even when laws prohibit racial discrimination.
These competing visions of race and racism result in opposing diagnoses of,
and prescriptions for, racial inequality. Whereas colorblindness prescribes raceblind remedies, colorconsciousness invites remedies that center race—often in
open and explicit ways.
But it is at this site of contestation—where the Left defends raceconsciousness—that the Left turns Right. More precisely, privileged voices on
the Left often defend race-conscious policies on terms that reify colorblind
conceptions of race and racism. I term this dynamic—whereby colorblindness
penetrates earnest antiracist advocacy—colorblind capture. Affirmative action21
is a salient example. Since the fall of Jim Crow, liberals have supported raceconscious hiring and admissions practices. But when doing so, advocates tend
to frame affirmative action as an acceptable “racial preference”—that is,
19

“The Left” is an admittedly obtuse term that captures a diverse set of individuals and
entities that embrace a range of political philosophies, racial ideologies, and normative
commitments. Still, I employ the term because the Left (as a catchall category juxtaposed
with the Right) is generally viewed as (more) committed to racial justice and civil rights.
20
A significant exception includes scholars and activists—many who identify with critical
projects—who have critiqued standard liberal defenses of affirmative action. See, e.g., Devon
W. Carbado, Footnote 43: Recovering Justice Powell’s Anti-Preference Framing of
Affirmative Action, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1117, 1149 (2019) (“Rather than defend
affirmative action in lukewarm and defensive terms as a ‘preference’ whose costs are
begrudgingly justifiable, liberal Supreme Court justices should defend affirmative action
affirmatively as a structural corrective—or, as I have called it, a countermeasure—to the
operation of implicit biases.”); Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and
the Myth of Preferential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative
Action Debate, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 15-16 (1994) (critiquing how affirmative
action defenders tend to characterize policy as “preferential treatment” nonetheless justified
as “compensation” for past injuries).
21
For a definition of affirmative action see supra note 2.
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justifiable discrimination that harms otherwise deserving whites.22 This framing,
which suggests race-consciousness corrupts a race-neutral baseline, is neither
inevitable nor strategic.23 Moreover, it contravenes the structuralist theories of
race and racism that the Left otherwise endorses. Nonetheless, most voices on
the Left continue to frame affirmative action as a racial preference—even when
doing so contravenes structuralist accounts of racism and erodes the moral and
legal case for antiracist efforts.24
Litigation targeting Harvard and UNC’s race-conscious admissions policies,
now before the Supreme Court, embodies this dynamic.25 In both cases, the
university defendants, sympathetic judges, and third-party stakeholders exhibit
colorconscious instincts.26 One might expect these affirmative action advocates
to defend race-conscious admissions as modest interventions that promote racial
neutrality by countering racial advantages that benefit white applicants.27 This
22

See Carbado, supra note 20, at 1137 (“[W]hereas liberals believe that the costs of
affirmative action are outweighed by its benefits (including diversity), conservatives perceive
the costs of the policy (‘reverse discrimination’) too high a price to pay regardless of its
benefits.”); Cheryl I. Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1215,
1220 (2002) (“[A]n increasing source of frustration was the inadequacy of the liberal response
that too often accepted the premise that race consciousness amounted to racism and that too
often argued for race-conscious remediation as temporary, exceptional, and aberrational
within an otherwise neutral legal frame.”).
23
See infra Sections III.A.2, III.A.3 (outlining empirical case for countermeasure
framing); see also Michelle Adams, The Last Wave of Affirmative Action, 1998 WIS. L. REV.
1395, 1463 (1998) (“Race-conscious, non-preferential affirmative action programs ensure
enhanced and vigorous competition for benefits such as employment and housing, and seek
to even what has historically been an extraordinarily skewed playing field. As such, these
programs promote the American ideal of a truly colorblind society and are necessary to ensure
equal opportunity for all its citizens.”).
24
See Carbado, supra note 20, at 1129; see also Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v.
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. (SFFA v. Harvard I), 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 202-03 (D.
Mass. 2019) (“Race conscious admissions will always penalize to some extent the groups that
are not being advantaged by the process, but this is justified by the compelling interest in
diversity and all the benefits that flow from a diverse college population.”), aff’d, 980 F.3d
157 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022).
25
See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. (SFFA
v. Harvard II), 980 F.3d 157, 170 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022);
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 567 F. Supp. 3d 580, 585-86 (M.D.N.C.
2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 896 (2022).
26
See discussion infra Section II.B.
27
One way that race-conscious admissions render race less relevant in the admissions
process is by countering racial advantages and disadvantages that arise before, during, and
after the admissions process. I employ the term racial (dis)advantage to capture the
constellation of racial advantages white applicants enjoy and the racial disadvantages that
burden applicants of color. For an overview of racial (dis)advantages common to admissions
regimes, see Carbado, supra note 20, at 1158-59 (“[R]elative to black students, white students
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is not the story Harvard and UNC tell. Instead, they defend their own admissions
practices as necessary departures from an otherwise race-neutral regime.28 This
framing treats an applicant’s race as irrelevant until the moment it is named and
accounted for. As a result, our formal affirmative action advocates reproduce a
colorblind admissions story that insulates facially neutral29 processes from
critique and rationalizes the over-representation of white (and often wealthy)
students in elite institutions.30
Harvard and UNC’s affirmative action advocacy epitomizes colorblind
capture. When it occurs in the context of litigation, the harm transcends
weakening the legal case for race-conscious admissions. Affirmative action
lawsuits have long served as proxies for broader public contestation over the
enduring meaning of race and racism in America.31 Litigation is where the
parties, judges, and public debate what, if anything, is necessary to overcome a
past defined by legalized white supremacy. Thus, when affirmative action
advocates promulgate narratives that locate racism in the past (or otherwise
outside the institution itself), it does more than undermine race-conscious
remedies—it also facilitates regressive campaigns to discredit the legitimacy and
moral authority of antiracism itself.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I introduce and unpack the concept
of colorblind capture. In Part II, to concretize the theory, I review colorblind
capture’s presence within affirmative action litigation past and present. This
review reveals how colorblindness, although a creature of the Right, has long
“captured” the Left. In Part III, I outline how affirmative action advocates could
defend race-conscious policies without reproducing colorblind conceptions of
race and racism. This final section coalesces around three insights: (1) colorblind
capture is pervasive, but avoidable; (2) colorblind capture obscures racial
(dis)advantages embedded within facially neutral processes; and (3) colorblind
capture enables racial retrenchment by eroding any meaningful legal or moral
distinction between antiracism and racism.
effectively experience a windfall from inhabiting learning environments in which their race
raises no questions about their intellectual competence or social belonging. Consequently,
those students can traverse educational environments with (at a minimum) the benefit of the
doubt, realize their academic potential without race-based burdens, and thus reflect that
potential more effectively in their admissions file.” (footnote omitted)).
28
See discussion infra Section II.B.
29
For purposes of this Article, I employ the term facially neutral to encompass all
admissions practices that are not race-conscious as defined above. See supra note 2.
30
See Khiara M. Bridges, Class-Based Affirmative Action, or the Lies that We Tell About
the Insignificance of Race, 96 B.U. L. REV. 55, 57-58 (2016) (“[P]ursuant to our thick
understanding of racial justice, it is not enough that racial minorities merely are present at
schools from which they have been excluded. Equally if not more important are the stories
that we tell about why they are there.”).
31
See Haney López, supra note 4, at 1028 (highlighting foremost CRT scolar Neil
Gotanda’s recognition “that debates over the nature of equality and the scope of equal
protection inescapably turned on competing understandings of race”).
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COLORBLIND CAPTURE: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL

Competing Theories of Race and Racism
1.

Colorblindness (on the Right)

Colorblindness, which remains the leading racial ideology on the Right,32
embodies specific conceptions about what race is and what racism entails.33 On
race, colorblindness adheres to what Neil Gotanda termed formal race—a
concept that reduces race to “neutral, apolitical descriptions, reflecting merely
‘skin color’ or country of ancestral origin.”34 Put differently, race is treated as
an otherwise irrelevant biological fact or physical attribute—no different than
eye color, handedness, or mayonnaise preference.35 In short, colorblindness
contends that race does not matter unless identifiable actors or entities
consciously make it so.36 One could depict this colorblind conception of race in
the following equation.
The Colorblind Story
race = irrelevant
This presumption, which grounds conceptions of race, also shapes colorblind
conceptions of racism. Broadly, it translates to the mantra that the government
should not (morally), and may not (legally), distinguish between individuals

32

See id. at 992 (“Contemporary colorblindness arises out of both the doctrinal flow of
Supreme Court cases that washed away Jim Crow and the larger flood of changing racial ideas
over the twentieth century.”).
33
There are other dimensions of colorblindness, including ostensible commitments to
individualism, that transcend the immediate focus of this Article. See, e.g., Benjamin
Eidelson, Respect, Individualism, and Colorblindness, 129 YALE L.J. 1600, 1603 (2020)
(evaluating “central pillar” of colorblindness “that race-based state action wrongfully fails to
treat people as individuals”).
34
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4
(1991); see also Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Eddie Murphy and the Dangers of Counterfactual
Causal Thinking About Detecting Racial Discrimination, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1170
(2019) (explaining that colorblindness reduces race to physical markers “that people just have
and thereby obviously belong to a designated racial group”).
35
See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 34, at 1170.
36
See Trisha Powell Crain, After CRT Complaint, Huntsville Teacher Training
Investigated by Alabama State Officials, AL.COM (Dec. 13, 2021, 10:13 AM),
https://www.al.com/news/2021/12/after-crt-complaint-huntsville-teacher-traininginvestigated-by-alabama-state-officials.html [https://perma.cc/P2AB-A7EE] (describing
parent complaint that “school should not be teaching anything race related because race
doesn’t matter”).
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based on their race.37 From this backdrop, proponents of colorblindness decry
race-consciousness—that is, seeing and considering race—as the primary source
of twenty-first century racism.38 U.S. Senator Rick Scott neatly captured this
sentiment in his Plan to Rescue America, which states: “We are all made in the
image of God; to judge a person on the color of their epidermis is immoral.”39
To further unpack the foregoing, imagine it is 1955 and UNC formally
excludes Black students from its campus.40 When viewed through the lens of
colorblindness, this exclusionary policy is legally suspect (and racist) because
UNC distinguishes between Black and white students.41 The racial harm of
UNC’s race-consciousness, in other words, is seeing and accounting for race—
regardless of the purpose or consequence of that conduct.
The remedy, in turn, calls for facial neutrality—that is, a process that neither
sees nor accounts for an applicant’s racial identity. Once UNC stops “seeing
race,” colorblindness posits that race no longer operates in any material sense;
candidates are no longer advantaged or disadvantaged because of their race.42
The claim is that facial neutrality returns the admissions process to a race-neutral
baseline.43 The following equation, building on the first, advances this
Colorblind Story.
37
See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 1 (1992) (“The comfortable
metaphor stands for an austere proposition: that American government is, or ought to be,
denied the power to distinguish between its citizens on the basis of race.”).
38
See Haney López, supra note 4, at 989 (“[T]he underlying premise of reactionary
colorblindness is not simply that race-conscious remedies raise moral and political and even
constitutional problems, but that benign and invidious discrimination are indistinguishable
and equally pernicious.”).
39
12
Point
Plan,
RESCUE
AM.,
https://rescueamerica.com/12-point-plan/
[https://perma.cc/VV3C-4NBN] (last visited Oct. 25, 2022). Similar sentiment animates
Chief Justice John Roberts’s claim that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race
is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
40
Notwithstanding Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which prohibited
de jure racial segregation in public schools, UNC continued to formally exclude Black
students until federal courts intervened in 1955. Frasier v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.,
134 F. Supp. 589, 592 (M.D.N.C. 1955), aff’d, 350 U.S. 979 (1956) (per curiam).
41
The same logic anchors the claim that antiracism is racist because it sees race.
42
See Carbado, supra note 20, at 1134 (explaining that colorblindness equates facial
neutrality with racial neutrality—in the sense that neither white nor Black applicants are
favored or disadvantaged).
43
By racial neutrality, I mean a system in which applicants neither enjoy racial advantages
nor suffer racial disadvantages. One could define racial neutrality more broadly or narrowly.
I employ the above definition because adherents of colorblindness tend to equate facial
neutrality with the absence of racial (dis)advantage. See supra note 27 (defining racial
(dis)advantages). As I explore below, that empirical claim is inaccurate—in part because
common “colorblind” measures of merit systematically understate the existing abilities of
people from negatively stereotyped groups. See infra Section III (outlining racial
(dis)advantages within facially neutral processes).
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The Colorblind Story
race = irrelevant
facial neutrality = racial neutrality
So it is 1956, and UNC no longer considers an applicant’s race. Under a
colorblind conception of race, facial neutrality equals racial neutrality. By
extension, race will remain irrelevant unless UNC expressly makes it relevant.
How could this occur? One possibility is that UNC recognizes that it cannot
overcome the vestiges of its own racial exclusion without adopting a raceconscious admissions policy. But under the logic of colorblindness, the new
policy—although designed to rectify the institution’s own ignoble legacy—
commits the same sin as the prior practice: it renders race relevant. And by
departing from an ostensibly race-neutral baseline, this race-conscious
admissions policy confers a racial “preference” that “injures” white applicants.
One can capture the foregoing in the following equation, which builds on the
Colorblind Story.
The Colorblind Story
race = irrelevant
facial neutrality = racial neutrality
race-conscious = racial preference
It is worth noting that the empirical claim that affirmative action confers a
racial preference flows from the two preceding presumptions: (1) race is
irrelevant and (2) facial neutrality equals racial neutrality. The ensuing framing
of affirmative action as a racial preference dominates public debates about
affirmative action. Rarely, however, do we treat this framing as a contestable
empirical claim that relies on multiple contestable assumptions about race and
facial neutrality.44
One final piece of the Colorblind Story deserves mention. By decoupling race
from racism and conflating facial neutrality with racial neutrality, colorblindness
rationalizes and legitimizes systems that perpetuate white overrepresentation.
By reducing race to an irrelevant physical attribute, the Colorblind Story
suggests that racism is not the cause of enduring racial disparities. Some other
cause—perhaps cultural inferiority or inadequate preparation—is to blame.45
We can capture this final step with one more equation.

44
See Carbado, supra note 20, at 1132 (arguing that advocates should treat “claim that
affirmative action is a racial preference for what it is—a highly contestable claim, not an
empirical fact”).
45
See id. at 1139-40 (describing culture arguments that “black parents, community leaders,
and political figures should change the cultural habits of black teenagers, encourage them to
study hard and stay in school, and persuade them to jettison the thinking that associates the
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The Colorblind Story
race = irrelevant
facial neutrality = racial neutrality
race-conscious = racial preference
racial hierarchy = natural & legitimate
If you are writing the anti-affirmative action playbook, this is where you want
to land: a narrative that (1) rationalizes existing inequalities, (2) discredits
affirmative action as a racial preference that contravenes egalitarian norms, and
(3) permeates public discourse so much that it appears natural and evades lay or
legal scrutiny. To a significant degree, this is the narrative and framing that
structures this nation’s affirmative action ongoing discourse. Scholars, pundits,
and the public tend to treat affirmative action as a departure from racial
neutrality that harms innocent white (and, at times, Asian American) students.
The primary disagreement is whether that discrimination is acceptable—not
whether it is discrimination.
Colorblind capture helps explain why this narrative dominates our public
discourse. But before turning to this phenomenon, I first outline the conceptions
of race and racism that, at least on the surface, prevail on the Left.
2.

Colorconsciousness (on the Left)

For decades, liberal Justices and advocates have criticized colorblind
conceptions of race and racism. As for race, many on the Left reject the notion
of formal race that anchors colorblindness.46 Instead, liberals and progressives
tend to emphasize that race is a social construct forged over “hundreds of years
of historical practices starting with chattel slavery and colonization.”47 We might
call this “structural race” because it recognizes the myriad ways in which race
matters even when unnamed, unseen, or unaccounted for. We can visualize this
conception of race by making one tweak to our Colorblind Story.
The Colorconscious Story
race ≠ irrelevant
Structural theories of race suggest that facial neutrality does not guarantee
racial neutrality. Rather, race’s omnipresence means that facially neutral policies
and practices often reward and reproduce a range of racial (dis)advantages. This

pursuit of academics with ‘acting white’” along with education arguments that “black students
disproportionately attend poorly funded and underperforming schools” (footnote omitted)).
46
Whereas formalists reduce race to an irrelevant physical trait, structuralists view race as
“a central organizing theme of American society.” john a. powell, Structural Racism: Building
upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791, 793 (2008).
47
Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 34, at 1169.
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dynamic is captured in terms such as “structural racism” or “institutional
racism.” We can update our Colorconscious Story accordingly.
The Colorconscious Story
race ≠ irrelevant
facial neutrality ≠ racial neutrality
Returning to our UNC example, the colorconscious account would presume
that race remains relevant to UNC’s admissions process even after the university
eliminates its formal policy of racial exclusion. Why? Because race is more than
some irrelevant personal trait. It is a socially constructed phenomenon that exerts
force in myriad ways—regardless of whether UNC makes formal racial
distinctions.48 UNC’s shift from de jure segregation to formal equality is
insufficient to eradicate the racial (dis)advantages embedded within its
admissions process. Accordingly, when UNC adopts an affirmative action
measure, that act of race-consciousness does contravene an otherwise fair,
balanced, and race-free baseline. Rather, it intervenes against a baseline that
remains defined by racial (dis)advantage. Thus, by countering those racial
(dis)advantages, the race-conscious policy renders race less relevant and
constitutes no preference at all. We can integrate the above account into our
Colorconscious Story as follows.
The Colorconscious Story
race ≠ irrelevant
facial neutrality ≠ racial neutrality
race-conscious ≠ racial preference
To complete our Colorconscious Story, the preceding equations invite a
distinct theory about contemporary inequality. Contrary to colorblindness,
which attributes racial inequality to something other than racism, the
Colorconscious Story centers racism’s enduring role. Even if the precise
mechanisms remain underdefined, the lesson is clear: existing racial disparities
48
To suggest that race is relevant is not to identify precisely how race shapes an admissions
regime, nor precisely how an institution might reduce race’s relevance. Race could, for
example, shape (1) the credentials a university values, (2) the respective weight afforded a
given credential, and (3) students’ relative access to the resources necessary to acquire a given
credential. Race-blind admissions regimes also privilege students for whom race has not been
a salient feature of their lived experience. See Amici Curiae Students Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law at 8-9, SFFA v. Harvard I, 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019),
aff’d, 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022) (No. 14-cv-14176)
[hereinafter Harvard Intervenors Posttrial Brief] (“Race-blind admissions is active erasure.
To try to not see my race is to try to not see me simply because there is no part of my
experience, no part of my journey, no part of my life that has been untouched by my race.
And because of that, it would be nearly impossible for me to try to explain my academic
journey, to try to explain my triumphs without implicating my race.”).
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are neither natural nor legitimate. Rather, they derive from racial (dis)advantages
that continue to shape American society in ways that entrench racial hierarchy.
We can capture this final proposition in our last equation.
The Colorconscious Story
race ≠ irrelevant
facial neutrality ≠ racial neutrality
race-conscious ≠ racial preference
racial hierarchy ≠ legitimate & natural
B.

The Colorblind Turn

The above accounts are not meant to capture the full complexity and variance
of racial ideologies that span the political spectrum. Nevertheless, this portrayal
captures competing visions of race and racism in America. By extension, the
foregoing helps to illuminate the phenomenon of colorblind capture.
In theory, the Colorconscious Story should preview how the Left defends
affirmative action. One might expect, for example, an unapologetic defense that
frames affirmative action as essential antidiscrimination that reduces race’s
relevance in admissions, hiring, and beyond. Advocates could borrow from Jerry
Kang and Mahzarin Banaji, who championed affirmative action as a more “fair
measure” of student talent and potential.49 Or they could draw on Luke Harris
and Uma Narayan, who framed affirmative action as a modest countermeasure
that promotes racial neutrality.50 At a minimum, one would expect affirmative
action advocates to challenge the assertion that race-consciousness deviates
from a race-neutral baseline and constitutes preferential treatment.
In practice, this rarely occurs.51 Rather, affirmative action advocates often
trade on colorblind conceptions of race and racism—even when defending
antiracist efforts and resisting formalist visions of race.52 This includes the
overwhelming tendency to characterize affirmative action as a justifiable
departure from an otherwise race-neutral baseline.53

49

See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1067-68 (2006) (“‘Fair’ connotes the moral
intuition that being fair involves an absence of unwarranted discrimination, by which we mean
unjustified social category-contingent behavior. The term also connotes accuracy in
assessment. ‘Measure’ has the double meaning as well: measurement and an intervention
intentionally taken to solve a problem.”).
50
See Harris & Narayan, supra note 20, at 14-26 (“[A]ffirmative action, at its core, is an
attempt to promote equal opportunity, and full and unimpaired citizenship in the United
States.”).
51
See id. at 14.
52
See Carbado, supra note 20, at 1137.
53
See id.
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Due to its prevalence and impact, I term this common acquiescence to the
logic of colorblindness colorblind capture. Colorblind capture takes different
forms.54 Nonetheless, as I detail below, this phenomenon often entails some
combination of four discrete but interacting components. Affirmative action
advocates tend to: (1) misdescribe affirmative action,55 (2) extract race from
facially neutral criteria,56 (3) downplay race’s general relevance in facially
neutral selection processes,57 and (4) transpose any racial advantage from white
applicants to Black applicants.58
It behooves affirmative action advocates to avoid colorblind capture. First,
advocates risk internal contradiction. By reverting to formalist conceptions of
race and racism, advocates erode, if not abandon, the structural stories they
otherwise endorse. Second, advocates concede contestable claims concerning
the relationship between formal equality and racial neutrality. In so doing,
advocates reify the presumption that affirmative action entails preferential
treatment that violates norms of objectiveity and racial preference. Third,
advocates miss opportunities to reframe affirmative action as essential—if
insufficient—antidiscrimination necessary to yield more individualized,
objective, and merit-based processes.
II.
A.

COLORBLIND CAPTURE: THEN AND NOW

Colorblind Capture Then: Defending First-Wave Affirmative Action

In a 2019 article, Devon Carbado observed that even heralded liberal Justices
characterized affirmative action as a “racial preference.”59 This includes Justice
William Brennan, who displayed an early manifestation of colorblind capture in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,60 the Supreme Court’s first
substantive engagement with race-conscious admissions.61 Justice Brennan’s
preference-framing is notable, in part, because he simultaneously emphasized
race’s enduring relevance in post-Jim Crow America.62
This included the assessment that, by accounting for race, the University of
California Davis School of Medicine (“U.C. Davis”) “compensate[d] applicants,
who . . . are fully qualified to study medicine, for educational disadvantages
which . . . were a product of state-fostered discrimination.”63 The modern
54

See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.B.
See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
56
See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
57
See discussion infra Section II.B.3.
58
See discussion infra Section II.B.4.
59
See Carbado, supra note 20, at 1137.
60
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
61
See id. at 375 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
62
See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
63
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 375-76.
55
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vernacular was absent, but Justice Brennan articulated a structuralist story:
otherwise qualified students of color, because of “state-fostered [racial]
discrimination,” lacked an equal opportunity to attain academic credentials that
U.C. Davis valued.64 This was not a matter of qualifications or talent, but
structural barriers that impeded certain students’ ability to compile a competitive
admissions file.65 Justice Brennan recognized that U.C. Davis’s standard
admissions policy was facially neutral but far from racially neutral.
Justice Brennan also chastised colorblindness and its rising grip on the
Supreme Court’s race jurisprudence. Consider the following language:
[C]laims that law must be “color-blind” or that the datum of race is no
longer relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration rather than as
description of reality. . . . [R]eality rebukes us that race has too often been
used by those who would stigmatize and oppress minorities. Yet we
cannot . . . let color blindness become myopia which masks the reality that
many “created equal” have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior
both by the law and by their fellow citizens.66
From this backdrop, one might expect Justice Brennan to characterize U.C.
Davis’s race-conscious policy as a countermeasure that mitigated preexisting
racial (dis)advantages that artificially inflated the relative “merit” of white
applicants. At a minimum, Justice Brennan would reject attempts to describe the
school’s modest intervention as a racial preference. And yet, colorblind frames
intersperse Justice Brennan’s opinion:
• [T]here is absolutely no basis for concluding that Bakke’s rejection as
a result of Davis’ use of racial preference will affect him throughout
his life in the same way as the segregation of the [Black]
schoolchildren in Brown I would have affected them. Unlike
discrimination against racial minorities, the use of racial preferences
for remedial purposes does not inflict a pervasive injury upon
individual whites . . . .67
• In any admissions program which accords special consideration to
disadvantaged racial minorities, a determination of the degree of
preference to be given is unavoidable, and any given preference that
results in the exclusion of a white candidate is no more or less
constitutionally acceptable than a program such as that at Davis.68

64
65
66
67
68

Id.
See id.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
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“This distinction does not mean that the exclusion of a white resulting
from the preferential use of race is not sufficiently serious to require
justification.”69
Justice Brennan does not equate affirmative action with Jim Crow. Still, he
undercuts the structuralist story that anchors his distrust of colorblindness. To
begin, Brennan employed preference rhetoric. Whatever his intent, his language
implied that U.C. Davis gave an unfair race-based advantage to students of color.
We could map this onto standard colorblind capture dynamics as follows: Justice
Brennan (1) misdescribed U.C. Davis’s policy (as preferential); (2) downplayed
race’s relevance in facially neutral criteria; and (3) transposed racial advantage
by suggesting that race, to the extent relevant, injured white students.
Justice Brennan’s liberal colleagues displayed similar antipathy for
colorblindness. Justice Harry Blackmun, for example, famously declared: “In
order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other
way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them
differently.”70 Justice Thurgood Marshall, perhaps the most colorconscious
Justice in history, invoked Reconstruction Era antiracist remedies. But when he
did, he described those remedies as special treatment for Black people.71 This
language arises within Justice Marshall’s robust and historically laden defense
of race-conscious remedies.72 Nonetheless, the phrase “special treatment”—akin
to “racial preference”—invites the claim that an individual’s racial identity is
inoperative until the moment the government expressly considers it.73 I do not
mean to overstate the presence of colorblind frames within the liberal Justices’
opinions. Rather, I mean to mark that even when these Justices foregrounded the
enduring power of race and racism in American society, they also employed
language that cast affirmative action as special treatment—as opposed to, for
example, equalizing treatment.
In Bakke, colorblind capture extended beyond the Supreme Court’s liberal
Justices to U.C. Davis, the formal defendant. U.C. Davis also recognized that
societal discrimination and racial subordination rendered their facially neutral

69

Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71
Id. at 397 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Despite the objection
to the special treatment the bill would provide for [Black people], it was passed by
Congress.”).
72
See, e.g., id. at 396-98 (discussing connection between passage of 1866 Freedmen’s
Bureau Act—which “was regarded, to the dismay of many Congressmen, as ‘solely and
entirely for the freedmen, and to the exclusion of all other persons’”—and Fourteenth
Amendment).
73
Since the eve of the Civil War, Supreme Court Justices—among other legal and political
actors—have deployed similar narratives to malign antiracist efforts. See The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (“When a man has emerged from slavery . . . there must be some
stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to
be the special favorite of the laws . . . .”).
70
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process unfair to students of color.74 This was not some tangential observation.
To appreciate how U.C. Davis presented a colorconscious story, consider this
(very long) heading from the first section of its Supreme Court brief:
The Legacy of Pervasive Racial Discrimination in Education, Medicine
and Beyond Burdens Discrete and Insular Minorities, as Well as the Larger
Society. The Effects of Such Discrimination Can Not Be Undone by Mere
Reliance on Formulas of Formal Equality. Having Witnessed the Failure
of Such Formulas, Responsible Educational and Professional Authorities
Have Recognized the Necessity of Employing Racially-Conscious Means
to Achieve True Educational Opportunity and the Benefits of a Racially
Diverse Student Body and Profession.75
Simply put, U.C. Davis conceded that race-consciousness was necessary to
mitigate the impact of race and racism that unfairly benefitted white applicants.76
U.C. Davis further outlined how racial (dis)advantages compromised the goal of
racial neutrality in standard medical school admissions processes.77 In so doing,
the U.C. Davis rejected the proposition that facial neutrality could produce racial
neutrality.78 Its race-conscious policy was accordingly designed to promote
fairness by “alleviati[ng], in a modest but important way, . . . the suppression of
racial minorities.”79
At bottom, U.C. Davis framed its policy as a structural counterpreference that
mitigated racial (dis)advantages that benefitted race- and class-advantaged white
applicants over more talented applicants of color.80 It is hard to imagine a more
cogent Colorconscious Story. And yet, in the next sentence, colorblind capture
crept in.
74

Brief for Petitioner at 69, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-00811) (acknowledging “long
and as yet unfinished road to the end of subordination of historically subjugated and alienated
minorities”).
75
Id. at 17.
76
See id. at 9-10 (“Yet toward the end of the last decade, many governmental and private
institutions, including this Court, came concurrently to the realization that a real effort to deal
with many of the facets of the legacy of past racial discrimination unavoidably requires
remedies that are attentive to race, that color is relevant today if it is to be irrelevant
tomorrow.”).
77
Id. at 10-11 (“The use of racially-blind admissions criteria resulted in near-total
exclusion of historically disfavored minorities during a period when the competition for
medical school places was only normally intense.”).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 70-71.
80
See id. at 56 n.62 (noting that individuals like Bakke are “correct[ly] characterize[ed]”
as “incidental beneficiaries of past discrimination” against racialized groups). To appreciate
the powerful pull of preference framing, one need only look to the source U.C. Davis cited
for this proposition. See id. (“If [white applicants] are excluded because of preferential
policies, they may be put in the position they would have been in if the discrimination had
never occurred.” (quoting Kent Greenwalt, Judicial Scrutiny of “Benign” Racial Preference
in Law School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 585 (1975))).
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As context, it is imporant to note that as of Bakke, the Supreme Court had not
determined whether strict scrutiny should apply to remedial racial
classifications.81 To buttress its argument that strict scrutiny was inappropriate,
U.C. Davis argued that “those who bear the burdens of such programs are neither
members of groups especially susceptible to race-related injuries nor in need of
protection from the results of normal political processes.”82 For present
purposes, the key is U.C. Davis’s suggestion that its programs burden certain
groups (read: white applicants).
This framing, which U.C. Davis employed on multiple occasions,83 implies
that U.C. Davis unfairly harmed students who were not covered by the “specialadmissions program.”84 This resembles the standard affirmative action
critique—a narrative that centers affirmative action’s purported “victims.”85
This story collides with U.C. Davis’s own recognition that race-consciousness
was necessary to “alleviat[e]” pervasive forces that “suppress[ed]” minority
enrollment.86 In other words, U.C. Davis recognized that the challenged policy
was necessary to counter race- and class-based (dis)advantages that benefitted
wealthy white applicants.87 To the extent U.C. Davis’s policy “burdened”
wealthy white applicants, the “burden” comprised the loss of expected
overrepresentation.88 This was not, however, the “burden” that U.C. Davis’s
language implied.

81
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-88 (1978) (discussing
applicability of strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs).
82
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 74, at 70 (emphasis added); see id. at 68-73 (presenting
reasons for inapplicability of strict scrutiny).
83
See, e.g., id. at 78 (“Likewise this is not a case of a preference for minorities that serves
no purpose whatsoever.”).
84
See id. at 66 (“Rejection of the applications of some whites due to special-admissions
programs is unavoidable.”).
85
See discussion supra Section I.A.1.
86
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 74, at 70-72 (“Moreover, the spectrum of groups not
included within special-admissions programs have a realistic recourse to political processes
to protect themselves.”).
87
The “burden” description also obscures the mechanics of U.C. Davis’s specialadmissions program, which was open to applicants of any race that could establish social
disadvantage. See id. at 44-47 (describing special admissions policy); see also JOEL DREYFUSS
& CHARLES LAWRENCE III, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 16-17 (1979)
(describing Bakke’s application to U.C. Davis and the admissions process).
88
See Harris & Narayan, supra note 20, at 25 (“Compensation arguments treat affirmative
action as involving the preferential treatment of those excluded, while we insist that
affirmative action represents an attempt to treat people with greater equality than would
otherwise be the case.”). In fact, U.C. Davis marshaled a similar argument before the Supreme
Court. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 74, at 46 (“[Bakke’s] position is that any diminution
in his chances for admission brought about by any reliance on racial criteria is forbidden by
the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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This tension reflects an early manifestation of colorblind capture. On the one
hand, U.C. Davis acknowledged that facially neutral practices rewarded
inherited race- and class-based advantages. Yet by suggesting that its policy
burdened whites, U.C. Davis acquiesced to an anti-affirmative action talking
point that now dominates public discourse and stigmatizes even modest raceconscious practices.
Ongoing litigation involving Harvard and UNC presents a similar dynamic.
The university defendants (and sympathetic judges) recognize race’s enduring
relevance. Yet they defend affirmative action on terms that reinforce colorblind
conceptions of race and racism.
B.

Colorblind Capture Now: Defending Affirmative Action at Harvard and
the University of North Carolina

I now turn to litigation at Harvard and UNC presently before the Supreme
Court.89 Below I unpack how both defendants exhibit each of the four tendencies
common to colorblind capture: (1) they misdescribe their own policies, (2) they
extract race from facially neutral criteria, (3) they downplay race’s relevance
across their admissions process, and (4) they transpose the groups that benefit
from racial (dis)advantages.90
1. Misdescribing Affirmative Action
For decades, many on the Left have misdescribed affirmative action as a racial
preference.91 This common framing misdescribes most race-conscious
admissions policies because it presumes a baseline free from racial
(dis)advantage.92
Harvard and UNC have largely abandoned the term “racial preference,”93
instead adopting terms such as “tip” or “plus factor.”94 This shift softens the
rhetoric, but Harvard and UNC continue to convey the message that race-

89
SFFA v. Harvard II, 980 F.3d 157, 170 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 895
(2022); Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 567 F. Supp. 3d 580, 585-86
(M.D.N.C. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 896 (2022).
90
This dynamic is not unique to Harvard and UNC. See supra notes 45-47 and
accompanying text.
91
See Harris & Narayan, supra note 20, at 14 (“Few question the assumption that
affirmative action involves the bestowal of preferences . . . .”).
92
See infra Part III (outlining how Harvard and UNC could more accurately defend their
respective policies).
93
Harvard and UNC largely avoid the term racial preference. See infra notes 96-100 and
accompanying text (citing examples from parties’ briefing). Yet, even in these limited
instances, the defendants fail to note that the term misrepresents how race operates within
their respective admissions processes.
94
See Brief for Defendant-Appellee President and Fellows of Harvard Coll. at 14, SFFA
v. Harvard II, 980 F.3d 157 (No. 19-02005).
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conscious admissions grant preferential treatment to Black students and deviate
from a race-free baseline.95
The following excerpts from Harvard and UNC illustrate this shift in
terminology but continuity in meaning:
• “Admissions officers may consider an applicant’s race or ethnicity as
one factor among many; race or ethnicity may function as a ‘tip’ or
‘plus’ that contributes to admission.”96
• “[The Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights] . . . found
that . . . the ‘tip’ for race or ethnicity provided an ‘opportunity for
Asian American ethnicity to be positively weighed in the admissions
process . . . .’”97
• “The court also rejected [Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.’s
(“SFFA”)] argument that Harvard uses race as more than a ‘plus’
factor, finding that Harvard does not consider race in a ‘rigid and
mechanical manner,’ but rather permits admissions officers to
consider race as a ‘tip’ . . . .”98
• “The lower courts found that Harvard considers race flexibly, only as
one factor among many, and only as a plus.99
• “[A]ny factor (race or any other) may be enough in an individual case
to properly tip the scales toward admission.”100
On the surface, terms like “tip” and “plus factor” offer certain appeal. Both
terms suggest a more innocuous process than one characterized as a racial
preference or preferential treatment. Moreover, the terms imply that race is
operative, but to a limited degree—thereby responding to the Supreme Court’s

95
The lower court opinions upholding the respective admissions policies, and the Biden
Administration’s brief objecting to certiorari, employ similar language. See SFFA v. Harvard
II, 980 F.3d at 170 (“Harvard has used a system of ‘tips’ in its application review process.
Tips are plus factors that might tip an applicant into Harvard’s admitted class.” (emphasis
added)); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.
v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. (SFFA v. Harvard III), 142 S. Ct. 895 (2021) (No.
20-01199) (“Harvard may award a ‘tip’ that improves an applicant’s chances of admission.
Tips are given based on various characteristics, including . . . race. Harvard also gives ‘tips’
to recruited athletes, legacy applicants, applicants on the Dean’s Interest List, and children of
faculty and staff . . . .” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
96
Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 94, at 14.
97
Id. at 18.
98
Id. at 25.
99
Brief in Opposition at 23, SFFA v. Harvard III, 142 S. Ct. 895 (filed May 2021) (No.
20-01199).
100
UNC Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 99, Students
for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 567 F. Supp. 3d 580 (M.D.N.C. 2021) (No. 1:14cv-00954).
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admonition that racial classifications “be employed no more broadly than the
interest demands.”101
That said, these terms reinforce colorblind logic. Whether a “tip” or a
“preference,” the language suggests that affirmative action departs from a raceneutral baseline and places a “racial thumb on the scale” for students of color.102
Today’s vernacular may be less charged, but it still (1) equates facial neutrality
with racial neutrality, and (2) naturalizes the contestable claim that raceconsciousness corrupts what would otherwise be a “racially neutral, merit-based
competition.”103
Terms like “tip” or “plus factor” do not necessarily connote a departure from
racial neutrality. But to avoid this connotation, one must identify raceconsciousness as a tool that promotes “objectivity” and “meritocracy” by
countering racial (dis)advantages that benefit white applicants. Neither Harvard
nor UNC do so. If anything, the defendants obscure how white racial advantages
permeate facially neutral components of their respective admissions
processes.104 This has occurred, in part, through the process of racial extraction.
2. Extracting Race
Harvard and UNC name structural racism. But they also reproduce colorblind
conceptions of race and racism by extracting race from facially neutral criteria.
In so doing, the universities (1) reduce race to racial identity, and (2) treat racial
identity as a natural, fixed, independent, and isolated variable. Racial extraction
is not limited to affirmative action debates; it reflects prevailing conceptions of
race across public and academic discourse.105
101

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).
Carbado, supra note 20, at 1173.
103
Id. at 1129.
104
Moreover, Harvard positions racial diversity against academic excellence, thereby
reinscribing the proposition that affirmative action benefits academically inferior applicants.
Brief in Opposition, supra note 99, at 8 (“It concluded that there currently are no workable
alternatives that would allow Harvard to achieve the educational benefits of diversity while
also maintaining its demanding standards of excellence.”); id. at 24 (“And Harvard need not
choose between pursuing academic excellence and the educational benefits of diversity.”).
105
Social scientists, for example, tend to treat race as a fixed and independent variable that
can explain varied outcomes. See Angela James, Making Sense of Race and Racial
Classifications, 4 RACE & SOC’Y 234, 244-45 (2001) (“I argue that social scientists, in
particular those using statistical models that include race as an independent variable, have
contributed to the conceptualization of race as a fixed characteristic.”); Devon W. Carbado &
Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social Science, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
149, 155 (2014) (“[T]he standard approach is to treat race (assumed to be an easily identified
and ‘natural’ demographic variable) as an independent variable—the causal agent of some
dependent variable or outcome (for example, test scores).”); Laura E. Gómez, A Tale of Two
Genres: On the Real and Ideal Links Between Law and Society and Critical Race Theory, in
THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 453, 453 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004)
102
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The following graphic, which Harvard created to visualize its admissions
process, illustrates this dynamic.
Figure 1. Harvard Admissions Process Graphic.106

On the surface, the graphic appears agnostic with respect to competing racial
ideologies; it simply identifies race as one consideration among many.107 But
this portrayal is not agnostic. Rather, it employs a formalist conception of race
that reduces racial identity to “an easily identified and ‘natural’ demographic
variable”108 that exists independent of the other admissions criteria.

(“[M]any, if not most, law and society scholars conceive of race as a readily measurable,
dichotomous (black/white) variable that affects the law at various points.”). As a matter of
doctrine, this standard conception of race informs the diversity rationale (which views “race
as one factor among many”) and the command that universities explore “race-neutral
alternatives.” See SFFA v. Harvard II, 980 F.3d 157, 180 (1st Cir. 2020) (“The court examined
six race-neutral alternatives . . . (1) eliminating Early Action; (2) eliminating ALDC tips;
(3) improving recruiting efforts and financial aid; (4) admitting more transfer applicants;
(5) eliminating standardized testing; and (6) instituting place-based quotas.”), cert. granted,
142 S. Ct. 895 (2022).
106
Admissions Process, HARVARD ADMISSIONS LAWSUIT, https://www.harvard.edu/
admissionscase/admissions-process/ [https://perma.cc/5MMU-8MUQ] (last visited Oct. 25,
2022).
107
UNC describes race in similar terms. See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ.
of N.C., 567 F. Supp. 3d 580, 601 (M.D.N.C. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 896 (2022).
108
Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 105, at 157.
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In certain respects, it would be difficult to tell a comprehensive racial story
without isolating race from other social determinants and axes of identity.109 The
danger, however, is that well-intended attempts to isolate “race” can reinforce a
Colorblind Story that reduces racial identity110 to a natural and self-realizing
personal trait. This, in turn, invites the false dichotomy between race-conscious
practices (where race is ostensibly operative) and facially neutral practices
(where race is ostensibly inoperative). Put differently, racial extraction silos race
to the moment of race-consciousness.
Race does not operate uniformly across each of Harvard’s admissions criteria.
Even within a single criterion (e.g., standardized test scores), race often operates
in multiple and distinct ways.111 But the basic insight remains: racial
(dis)advantages shape many, if not all, of Harvard’s admissions criteria.112 But
Harvard obscures this reality by visually extracting race from other
considerations. In so doing, Harvard reinforces the narrative that affirmative
action is the moment when race “enters” the admissions process.
As one example, consider how Harvard discursively extracts race from its
“academic rating”—a metric that “summarizes the applicant’s academic
achievement and potential based on factors including grades, standardized test
scores, recommendation letters, academic work and prizes, and the strength of
the applicant’s academic program.”113 Harvard consistently treats these

109
See Devon W. Carbado, Critical What What?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1593, 1613-14 (2011)
(“In describing racism as an endemic social force, CRT scholars argue that it interacts with
other social forces, such as patriarchy, homophobia, and classism.”).
110
By racial identity, I refer to the racial categories (e.g., Black and white), the societal
“rules” that determine who belongs in a given racial category (e.g., the rule of hypodescent),
and the meanings associated with a given category (e.g., predisposed to criminality or law
abiding).
111
See Jonathan P. Feingold, Equal Protection Design Defects, 91 TEMPLE L. REV. 513,
530, 537 (2019) (outlining how standardized test scores tend to undermeasure the existing
academic talent and potential of students from stigmatized groups because (1) structural
forces unevenly distribute access to critical test-taking resources and (2) pervasive racial
stereotypes compromise the test performance of highly motivated, academically talented, and
well-prepared students from negatively stereotyped groups).
112
See Jonathan P. Feingold, “All (Poor) Lives Matter”: How Class-Not-Race Logic
Reinscribes Race and Class Privilege, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Oct. 30, 2020),
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/10/30/aa-feingold/ [https://perma.cc/CAR9-2U37]
(disputing idea that admissions processes can, for example, “disentangle an applicant’s race
and class”); Devon W. Carbado, Kate M. Turetsky & Valerie Purdie-Vaughns, Privileged or
Mismatched: The Lose-Lose Position of African Americans in the Affirmative Action Debate,
64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 174, 174 (2016) (noting that variety of race-based
disadvantages “can diminish the competitiveness of a black student’s admissions file”).
113
Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 94, at 9.
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considerations as neutral, objective, and nonracial.114 The following statement
is illustrative:
Comparing race to other factors in the admissions process, [plaintiff] relies
principally on a rudimentary statistical analysis that the district court
rejected because it “over emphasize[d] grades and test scores.” As
Professor Card showed and as the district court found, ‘the magnitude of
race-based tips is not disproportionate to the magnitude of other tips
applicants may receive.115
Read together, this passage and the preceding graphic suggest that race
operates within a single site of Harvard’s admissions process: the formal
consideration of race. Harvard’s arguments for affirmative action dislocate race
from its facially neutral criteria—and thereby reinforce the colorblind claim that
university admissions are race-neutral but for affirmative action.
Consider, also, how Harvard discusses “Legacy+” preferences—the
admissions boost Harvard extends to the children of alumni, athletic recruits,
dean’s list members, and the children of faculty and staff (“ALDC”).116 By most
metrics, Legacy+ preferences confer an unearned race/class bonus to wealthy
white applicants.117 According to SFFA’s own expert, 43% of Harvard’s white

114

Exacerbating this tendency, Harvard and UNC objected to evidence that would have
revealed how their admissions policies bestow unearned race and class privileges to wealthy
white applicants. See Jonathan P. Feingold, Ambivalent Advocates, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 21) (on file with author) (“Harvard and UNC defend their
own policies on colorblind terms that delegitimize their own policies and discredit attempts
to counter institutional arrangements that, in effect, lead to the admission of wealthy white
students over more talented and deserving students from marginalized groups.”).
115
Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 94, at 14 (citations omitted). UNC employed
near-identical language. See Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
at 100, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 567 F. Supp. 3d 580 (M.D.N.C.
2021) (No. 1:14-cv-00954) [hereinafter UNC Proposed Findings] (emphasis added)
(“Professor Hoxby found that race and ethnicity plays a smaller role than standardized test
scores—an analysis that Professor Arcidiacono made no effort to conduct.”).
116
The First Circuit portrayed Harvard’s legacy preference in similar terms. See SFFA v.
Harvard II, 980 F.3d 157, 171 (1st Cir. 2020) (“At the time, Harvard reviewed applications
using a process like the one challenged in this lawsuit in the sense that it used a rating system
and tips for race and [children of alumni, donors, faculty, or staff, known as] ALDC
applicants.”), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022). Beyond legacy preferences, universities
often value aspects of applicant identity untethered to academic ability that disparately benefit
white applicants. See Tim Wise, Whites Swim in Racial Preference, RACE, RACISM & THE L.
(Feb. 20, 2003), https://racism.org/articles/basic-needs/affirmative-action/1105-affirm20-1
[https://perma.cc/WGS5-P72U] (noting that fifty-eight out of a total of 150 points available
to University of Michigan applicants disparately or exclusively benefitted white applicants).
117
See Peter Arcidiacono, Josh Kinsler & Tyler Ransom, Legacy and Athlete Preferences
at Harvard, 40 J. LAB. & ECON. 133, 147 (2020) (noting that for “a white typical applicant
with a baseline probability of admission of 10%,” applicant’s admission probability would
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admits are Legacy+ students.118 For admitted students of color, the number does
not exceed 16%.119 Even among legacy applicants, Harvard admits white legacy
applicants at a higher rate than Black legacy applicants.120 SFFA’s expert
concluded that 75% of Harvard’s white Legacy+ admits would have been
rejected if Harvard judged them on their academic profile alone.121 Put
differently, were Harvard to eliminate all Legacy+ preferences, “[t]he admit rate
for all white ALDC applicants would fall from 43.6% to 11.4%, a drop of more
than thirty percentage points.”122 During the relevant period, this equated to over
1,600 white admits (underqualified per Harvard’s own standards)—a number
that exceeds all Black and Latinx admits over the same period.123
For present purposes, I provide these data points because they quantify the
claim that legacy preference is racial preference. Given the histories of racial
exclusion at elite universities, this is not surprising. Legacy preferences function
as “grandfather clauses”—the facially neutral exemption that permitted poor
whites to vote when the law would have otherwise prohibited it.124 Harvard, in
turn, could justify affirmative action as antidiscrimination that reduces the racial
advantage it extends to wealthy white applicants.125 Harvard does not take this
route. If anything, Harvard evades any discussion or critique of its Legacy+
preferences.126

increase to 49% “[i]f this applicant were switched to a legacy, holding all other characteristics
fixed”).
118
According to the study, each of these “preferences primarily benefit white students.”
Id. at 153. While white applicants comprise 40% of Harvard’s overall applicant pool, 70% of
Harvard’s ALDC applicants are white. See id. at 135. Some of these statistics made an
appearance in the First Circuit’s opinion. See SFFA v. Harvard II, 980 F.3d at 171 (noting
higher admissions rates and white makeup of legacy applicants). Nonetheless, the panel did
not treat legacy as a racial advantage for white applicants that affirmative action could
counter.
119
See Arcidiacono et al., supra note 117, at 133.
120
See id. at 138 (noting, for example, that “white and African American applicants on the
dean’s list have admit rates of 42% and 33%, respectively”).
121
See id.
122
See id. at 149.
123
Id. at 148 tbl.4.
124
See Alan Greenblatt, The Racial History of the “Grandfather Clause,” NPR: CODE
SWITCH
(Oct.
22,
2013,
9:44
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/10/21/239081586/the-racial-history-of-thegrandfather-clause [https://perma.cc/YNZ2-BLAZ] (explaining racist history of grandfather
clauses).
125
A comprehensive countermeasure would arguably include a policy that prohibits
Harvard from admitting any legacy students.
126
Harvard concedes that legacy bonuses are unrelated to an applicant’s academic merit.
See SFFA v. Harvard II, 980 F.3d 157, 178 (1st Cir. 2020) (“Preferencing legacy applicants
‘helps to cement strong bonds between the university and its alumni,’ fosters community-
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This evasion manifests even within the above admissions graphic. That image
portrays “race / ethnicity / background” as one of Harvard’s nine discrete
admissions considerations.127 Legacy+ preferences do not appear as one of the
eight other considerations. Rather, Harvard buries Legacy+ preferences—that
account for 33% of Harvard’s white admits—within an ellipsis that bears the
name “Other Considerations.”128
When Harvard discusses Legacy+ preferences, it describes the policy as just
another “tip.”129 Even here, Harvard compromises the case for affirmative
action. By employing the same term for affirmative action and Legacy+
preferences, Harvard invites a false equivalence both in kind and degree.
As for kind, the common language suggests that both considerations confer
preferences that depart from objective measures of merit.130 The only distinction
concerns the class of beneficiaries.131 Harvard thereby erodes any meaningful
distinction between a policy that reproduces inequality by rewarding those who
do less with more (Legacy+ preferences) and one that levels the playing field by
rewarding those who do more with less (affirmative action). Harvard, in turn,
reifies the same colorblind logic that denies any meaningful difference between
Jim Crow and the policies designed to remedy that legacy.
But Harvard does more than conflate the policies’ divergent functions. By
applying the imprecise term “tip,” Harvard understates the disproportionate
advantage Legacy+ applicants enjoy.132 Legacy+ “tips” weigh more than any

building, and encourages alumni to donate their time and money to support Harvard.”), cert.
granted, 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022).
127
Admissions Process, supra note 106.
128
Id.
129
Brief in Opposition, supra note 99, at 5 (explaining that admissions officers “may give
an applicant a ‘tip’ for unusual intellectual ability; strong personal qualities; the capacity to
contribute to racial, ethnic, socioeconomic, or geographic diversity; outstanding creative or
athletic ability; or excellence in other dimensions”).
130
UNC also confers legacy preferences for out-of-state applicants. See Fact Check, UNIV.
OF
N.C.: ADMISSIONS CASE, https://admissionslawsuit.unc.edu/lawsuit/fact-check/
[https://perma.cc/RW7D-S47D] (last visited Oct. 25, 2022) (observing that “[o]ut-of-state
children of alumni receive narrow legacy consideration”).
131
A claim common to public discourse is that legacy preferences constitute “affirmative
action” for whites. See, e.g., T.H. Rawls, Legacy Admissions: Affirmative Action for Whites,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2017, at A18 (“There is also one deliberate and robust admissions policy
used at many colleges that in effect constitutes white affirmative action: That is the preference
given in admissions decisions to the children of alumni of the college.”). This framing reflects
the widespread recognition that legacy preferences function as white racial preferences and
the dominant presumption that affirmative action comprises “racial preferences” for people
of color.
132
A similar analysis extends to “low-income students.” See SFFA v. Harvard II, 980 F.3d
157, 172 (1st Cir. 2020) (comparing tip received by low-income students to larger tip received
by legacies and athletes).

2022]

COLORBLIND CAPTURE

1977

other consideration.133 By one account, the “typical” white applicant would see
their admission probability increase from 10% to 65% if they were a double
legacy.134 In contrast, were this “typical” candidate covered by Harvard’s
affirmative action policy, their likelihood of admission would increase to
36%.135
To be clear, the foregoing statistics should not be taken as the authoritative
account of Harvard’s Legacy+ preferences. Among other concerns, the
underlying analyses omit multiple variables that shape the actual admissions
process.136 Moreover, any counterfactual that asks “what if a white student were
Black?” inaccurately assumes that one can simply alter race and hold all other
variables constant. Even recognizing these limitations, the data suggest that
Harvard misrepresents its Legacy+ preferences—both with respect to their
substance and impact. At minimum, the power that Harvard’s Legacy+
preferences hold over admissions outcomes reinforces the need to shift the
question from whether race shapes admissions outcomes to how it does.
In its decision upholding Harvard’s admissions process, the First Circuit
seemed poised to make this turn when it “describe[d] the background against
which Harvard’s tip tak[es] race into account.”137 But rather than identify racial
(dis)advantages—such as legacy preferences—embedded across Harvard’s
admissions process, the Court siloed race to the moment of formal raceconsciousness. One is hard-pressed to fault the court; it did little more than
follow Harvard’s lead.
3. Downplaying Race
As noted above, many on the Left recognize that facial neutrality does not
guarantee racial neutrality. But even if one recognizes that racial (dis)advantages
pervade the admissions context, a different question concerns the magnitude of
those (dis)advantages: Are they marginal or defining features of the admissions
landscape?
One might expect affirmative action advocates to emphasize race’s centrality
within and across facially neutral criteria. Harvard might, for example, offer the
following assessment: “[R]ace permeates the admissions process to such an
extent that it must be a predominant factor as the University makes its

133

See Rawls, supra note 131 (discussing magnitude of legacy preferences).
See Arcidiacono et al., supra note 118, at 147.
135
See id. (“Yet shifting this typical [white] applicant into the disadvantaged category only
increases the admission probability to 36%.”).
136
See SFFA v. Harvard II, 980 F.3d at 172 (“This model . . . suffered from the same
problems and limitations as [Harvard’s Office of Institutional Research’s] earlier models in
that it omitted many variables that Harvard actually considered in its admissions process.”).
137
Id. at 172.
134
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decisions.”138 On its face, this statement buttresses the claim that affirmative
action functions as a counterpreference that renders race less relevant in
admissions. It may be surprising, therefore, that the statement comes from
neither Harvard nor UNC, but from SFFA, the plaintiff suing to eliminate
affirmative action.139
Harvard and UNC could have leaned into this claim. For example, they could
have conceded that race permeates their admissions process—because racial
(dis)advantages shape most, if not all, of their facially neutral considerations.
This includes a range of metrics—including interviews, test scores, and
grades—that tend to understate the academic talent and potential of students of
color. Affirmative action is necessary, in turn, to counter the racial advantages
white applicants would otherwise enjoy.
Harvard and UNC have not taken this approach. Instead, they downplay
race’s overall impact on their respective admissions processes. The following
statements are illustrative:
• “SFFA asserts . . . that ‘[r]ace is often the reason that someone gets
lopped,’ i.e., removed from the tentatively admitted class due to class
size constraints. That too is false.”140
• “Even SFFA’s expert conceded that ‘a large number of applicants to
Harvard will be rejected without race ever becoming a factor.’”141
• “[R]ace ‘never becomes the defining feature” [sic] of applications,’—
consideration of race never results in the admission of unqualified
applicants, race-based tips are ‘not disproportionate to the magnitude
of other tips,’ and race-based tips ‘are not nearly as large’ as those
approved by the Court in Grutter . . . .”142
• “Thus, no matter which preferred model is used—[Defendant’s] or
[Plaintiff’s]—race and ethnicity is not the dominant factor in whether
an applicant is admitted or rejected across the University’s admissions
process.”143

138
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 567 F. Supp. 3d 580, 602
(M.D.N.C. 2021) (“Plaintiff contends that the consideration of race permeates the admissions
process to a degree that suggests race is a predominant factor.”), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 896
(2022).
139
See id.; see also Jay Caspian Kang, Where Does Affirmative Action Leave AsianAmericans?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 1, 2019, at 34 (quoting Edward Blum, founder of SFFA,
as saying “[w]e believe that a student’s skin color or ethnic heritage should not be used to
help or harm that student’s prospects of being admitted to a college or university”).
140
Brief in Opposition, supra note 99, at 16 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
141
Id. at 23.
142
Id. (citations omitted).
143
UNC Proposed Findings, supra note 115, at 44; see also Students for Fair Admissions,
Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 567 F. Supp. 3d at 634 (“[R]ace plays a role in a very small percentage
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•

“[T]aken as a whole, the record evidence establishes that race and
ethnicity is not the dominant factor in the University’s admissions
process.”144
One can understand why Harvard and UNC took the above approach. The
Supreme Court requires universities to evaluate each applicant “as an individual
and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature
of his or her application.”145 This admonition suggests that race may inform the
admissions process, but may not become a “defining feature” of an applicant’s
file.146 Even if one agrees that race should not define the admissions process,
that principle does not answer whether facial neutrality or race-consciousness
gets you there. Put differently, even if the Constitution condemns selection
processes where race predominates, there is no inherent reason why the
Constitution prefers facially neutral processes over affirmative action. That
conclusion requires a factual backdrop in which race is inoperative until that
moment universities consciously think about and act on race. Trading on this
basic logic, Harvard and UNC could champion affirmative action as a tool to
reduce race’s predominance across facially neutral criteria. But doing so would
require Harvard and UNC to foreground the myriad sites within their admissions
processes that reward inherited white racial advantage. Neither university has
done so.
This discursive shift might make no difference to a hostile and ideologically
motivated Supreme Court. But it matters. Identifying race as a defining feature
of ostensibly colorblind selection criteria counters predictable lines of legal and
political attack. The alternative—that is, minimizing race’s impact across
facially neutral considerations—rationalizes enduring inequality and facilitates
resurgent attacks on antiracism at large.

of decisions: 1.2% for in-state students and 5.1% for out-of-state students.”); id. at 627 (“[T]he
evidence tends to show that race is not a predominate factor in the University’s candidate
evaluations.”); id. at 602 (“Plaintiff has provided no evidence that UNC . . . has allowed race
to become a predominant factor in the admissions process, or has failed to adequately reflect
on the role race plays in admissions decisions.”).
144
UNC Proposed Findings, supra note 115, at 100; see also id. at 42-43 (comparing the
relative impact of race and standardized test scores on admissions outcomes).
145
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003); see also SFFA v. Harvard II, 980 F.3d
157, 190 (1st Cir. 2020) (citing first Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-72 (2003); and
then Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016) for proposition that race had not
become “decisive factor in admissions”). This doctrinal backdrop helps to explain why the
student intervenors, who otherwise employ a counterpreference framing, also downplay
race’s overall relevance. See Harvard Intervenors Posttrial Brief, supra note 48, at 30 (“To be
clear, race may have played a limited role in the admissions of Ms. Cole and Ms. VasquezRodriguez, but there is absolutely nothing suspect about a university ascribing value to an
applicant’s ability to contribute to campus diversity based, in part, on their race.”).
146
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
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4. Transposing Racial Advantage
There are moments when Harvard and UNC suggest that racial
(dis)advantages impact the admissions competition. But rather than
acknowledge how colorblind considerations confer racial advantages to white
applicants, the defendants suggest that affirmative action bestows racial
advantages to students of color. In so doing, Harvard and UNC do more than
obscure how their respective admissions processes benefit white applicants.
They also transpose racial advantage by suggesting that to the extent it exists, it
flows to students of color.
This is another manifestation of preference framing. Harvard and UNC could
frame the question as whether their affirmative action policy is robust enough to
neutralize racial (dis)advantages that benefit white applicants. Yet by
transposing racial advantage, the defendants distort the inquiry to whether their
respective policies extend too much “preferential treatment” to students of color.
To appreciate how Harvard and UNC transpose racial advantage, consider the
following four statements:
1. “The consideration of race only ever benefits students who are
otherwise highly qualified, and it is not decisive even for those
candidates.”147
2. “[Plaintiff’s expert] acknowledged that race makes a difference only
for a ‘competitive pool’ of applicants that is ‘defined by a variety of
variables and factors’ other than race.”148
3. “Simply because race and ethnicity might tip the scale for some
students who are ‘on the bubble’ of being admitted or rejected does
not mean that race and ethnicity plays a dominant role in the
admissions decision and across the entire pool of applicants.”149
4. “[Plaintiff’s expert] further admitted that race is ‘not a dominant factor
for white applicants.’”150
The foregoing statements suggest that race, to the extent it shapes admissions
outcomes, benefits students of color. This is inconsistent with colorconscious
147

Brief in Opposition, supra note 99, at 6.
Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 94, at 63 (emphasis added). Harvard conveys
a similar message when it denies imposing an “undue burden on any racial group.” See id. at
66 (“Addressing Harvard’s consideration of Asian-American applicants under the rubric of
‘undue burden,’ the court acknowledged that Asian-American (and white) students make up
a smaller share of Harvard’s class than they might under a race-neutral system.”).
149
UNC Proposed Findings, supra note 115, at 51; see also id. at 100 (“[R]ace explains,
at most, a very small share of applicants’ admissions outcomes.”).
150
Id. at 99; see Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 567 F. Supp. 3d 580,
630 (M.D.N.C. 2021) (“[Plaintiff’s expert testimony] suggests that, while there might be a set
of students who would see a sizable ‘bump’ in their admissions probability in the model
because of their race, a typical student would see a very minimal difference in their odds of
being admitted.”), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 896 (2022).
148
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conceptions of race and racism. But it is consistent with the other elements of
colorblind capture. When a university (1) misdescribes affirmative action as a
“racial preference,” (2) extracts race from ostensibly “colorblind”
considerations, and (3) downplays race’s overall impact on admissions, it
presents a world in which race is inoperative but for affirmative action. Against
this backdrop, it naturally follows that racial advantage, if present, flows to
affirmative action’s direct beneficiaries.
Multiple aspects of the four preceding claims—all of which transpose racial
advantage—deserve attention. To begin, Harvard and UNC conflate racial
advantage with the formal recognition of race—a conceptual move that elides
the race/class advantages wealthy white students enjoy in their respective
admissions processes.151 Note, as well, the suggestion that racial advantage only
benefits “highly qualified” students of color. This phrasing obscures how race
shapes the pool of “qualified” students long before the moment of admissions.
By isolating racial (dis)advantage to the moment of admissions, Harvard and
UNC erase how race shaped students’ access to the social, political, and
economic resources necessary to compile a competitive admissions file. From a
different angle, the same language naturalizes the overrepresentation of white
students within the pool of “highly qualified” students as the product of
individual effort, not structural advantage.
The tendency to transpose racial advantage facilitates anti-affirmative action
lay theories within public and legal discourse. Among other consequences, it
fuels the narrative that affirmative action harms Asian Americans.152 Harvard
and UNC deny that they discriminate against Asian American applicants. But
when they characterize affirmative action as the source of racial advantage, they
obscure white racial advantages that harm all students of color—including many
Asian Americans.153 In so doing, Harvard and UNC reinforce the claim that

151
When Harvard transposes racial advantage, the university obscures the racial advantage
embedded in legacy preferences—a boost without which 75% of white legacy applicants
would not gain admission. See Arcidiacono et al., supra note 117, at 147. When UNC
transposes racial advantage, the university obscures how North Carolina’s legacy of
desegregation resistance continues to shape its admissions process and campus life.
152
This narrative is not new. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 579 U.S. 365, 410 n.4 (2016)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s assertion that UT’s race-based policy does not
discriminate against Asian-American students . . . defies the laws of mathematics. UT’s
program is clearly designed to increase the number of African-American and Hispanic
students by giving them an admissions boost vis-à-vis other applicants . . . . Given a ‘limited
number of spaces,’ . . . providing a boost to African-Americans and Hispanics inevitably
harms students who do not receive the same boost by decreasing their odds of admission.”).
153
See Jonathan P. Feingold, SFFA v. Harvard: How Affirmative Action Myths Mask White
Bonus, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 707, 727-28 (2019) (“In a case that ostensibly centers Asian
vulnerability and victimhood, the one piece of SFFA’s complaint that confronts anti-Asian
bias runs up against steep doctrinal hurdles.”).
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affirmative action pits Asian Americans against other students of color.154 As a
result, entities targeting affirmative action need not construct a competing
narrative; they can exploit the universities’ own affirmative action story.
Colorblind capture is not inevitable. But to avoid it, affirmative action
advocates must not lose sight of the colorconscious conceptions of race and
racism they otherwise embrace. I next outline how universities, among other
stakeholders, might do so.
III. EVADING COLORBLIND CAPTURE
I have explored how affirmative action advocates often traffic in colorblind
conceptions of race and racism. Colorblind capture is ubiquitous. But it is not
inevitable. To illustrate, I now explore how Harvard and UNC could more
zealously defend their respective policies. My goal is modest: outline how
advocates can defend race-conscious admissions without abandoning a
colorconscious admissions story. Doing so starts with a basic reframe: rather
than ask whether race operates within admissions, ask how race operates.
To start, I outline how affirmative action can reduce race’s relevance before,
during, and after admissions. By contextualizing the backdrop against which
affirmative action intervenes, advocates can (1) fortify standard arguments (e.g.,
the diversity rationale), (2) leverage dormant insights (e.g., Justice Lewis
Powell’s antipreference rationale), and (3) challenge existing doctrine (e.g.,
applying strict scrutiny to remedial racial classifications).155 From here, I
identify two additional arguments that illuminate the predominance of race in
most facially neutral policies.
Two notes before proceeding. First, the following is not a one-size-fits-all
defense for race-conscious admissions. Advocates should tailor arguments to an
institution’s specific policy, local context, and history. For example, UNC spent
decades actively resisting federal mandates to desegregate its campus. Over the
same period, Harvard was among the first elite universities to adopt voluntary
race-conscious admissions policies. Still, the following offers a roadmap to
avoid the pitfalls of colorblind capture.

154

See id. at 718-19 (observing that positioning minority groups of color as victims of
affirmative action “presumptively pits different groups of color against one another”);
Kimberly West-Faulcon, Obscuring Asian Penalty with Illusions of Black Bonus, 64 UCLA
L. REV. DISCOURSE 590, 597-98 (2017).
155
Such an approach would better approximate the multifront offensive that SFFA has
marshalled against Harvard and UNC. SFFA has argued that (1) the universities violate
existing law, and (2) the Supreme Court should overturn precedent in ways that render
doctrine more hostile to affirmative action. See Complaint at 1-3, Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 308 F.R.D. 39 (D. Mass.), aff’d,
807 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2015) (No. 14-cv-14176) (arguing Harvard violated Title VI of Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and criticizing Supreme Court affirmative action cases); Complaint at 24, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 319 F.R.D. 490 (M.D.N.C. 2017)
(arguing that UNC violated Fourteenth Amendment and federal civil rights laws).
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Second, it is unlikely that any fact, argument, or rationale could persuade five
current Supreme Court Justices to preserve race-conscious admissions.156 But
advocates should not let the Justices set the terms of engagement.157 If there ever
were a time to mobilize the most compelling case for race-conscious admissions,
it is now.158 Affirmative action fights remain a site where the public debates the
enduring relevance of race and racism in America. In this moment of antiantiracist backlash, defending affirmative action as a justifiable “preference”
normalizes colorblindness and delegitimizes antiracism itself.159
A.

“Race Matters” Before, During, and After Admissions
1.

Before Admissions: Legacies of Racial Exclusion

In the wake of Jim Crow, federal courts recognized that the Constitution
permits entities to employ race-conscious practices to remedy discrimination.160
Within a generation, this remedial defense for affirmative action began to
encounter “political and legal obstacles.”161 Over the same period, the Supreme
156

Given the Supreme Court’s current hostility to civil rights, advocates may be wary of
marshaling novel arguments that the Court could reject—and thereby further restrict raceconscious practices. One strategy is to avoid litigation altogether. But as these cases reveal, it
is unlikely universities will be able to avoid Supreme Court review without abandoning the
challenged policy. And even if preemptively abandoning a policy prevented the creation of
“bad” law, this strategy leads to the same result: the end of the challenged policy. A distinct
set of questions might include the following: (1) How can universities rally public support
around affirmative action without exposing race-conscious practices to unnecessary judicial
scrutiny? (2) How might universities mitigate racial (dis)advantages even in the absence of
affirmative action? (3) How might universities leverage high-profile litigation to defuse antiaffirmative action talking points that compromise broader antiracist efforts?
157
See Carbado, supra note 20, at 1168 (“At the very least, liberal supporters of affirmative
action, on the Supreme Court and elsewhere, ought to put their best foot forward when they
defend the policy, which means reconceptualizing affirmative action as a countermeasure.”).
158
Moreover, the law is not static. Arguments unsuccessful today might bear future fruit.
See id. at 1130 (“Given that the Court has grown even more conservative as a result of its
recent additions, and the new challenges to affirmative action in the judicial pipeline, if ever
there was a time for liberal Supreme Court justices to play racial justice offense, it is now.”).
159
See id. at 1173 (“It would be worrisome, to say the least, if such conflations and
oversimplifications became the basis for the conservative Supreme Court justices to
adjudicate affirmative action as unconstitutional per se. Whether liberal supporters of
affirmative action realize it, they would be implicated in that outcome.”).
160
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 317 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(reconizing that “remedying past discrimination for which [the defendant] is responsible”
remains a compelling interest that justifies racial classifications).
161
Kang & Banaji, supra note 49, at 1067-68 (describing argument that discrimination as
tort is legal obstacle to remedial justification for affirmative action); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Sins of Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 92
(1986) (discussing challenges of remedial justification of affirmative action). Here, I use the
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Court circumscribed the meaning of unlawful “discrimination”162 and
heightened the evidentiary burden affirmative action defendants must
overcome.163 These obstacles help to explain why Harvard and UNC have
discarded remedial rationales to defend their race-conscious admissions
policies.164 These obstacles do not, however, justify abandoning remedial
rationales.165
terms remedial defense and remedial justification interchangeably to capture the rationale that
an entity may, consistent with the Constitution, employ race-conscious measures to remedy
its own prior discrimination. This differs from remedial measures designed to ameliorate
“societal discrimination,” a rationale the Supreme Court has rejected. See Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (“The State certainly has a legitimate and substantial
interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified
discrimination . . . . That goal was far more focused than remedying the effects of ‘societal
discrimination,’ an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the
past.”).
162
Given the Supreme Court’s reluctance to find cognizable discrimination in cases
spanning City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989); Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018); and Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321,
2343 (2021)—all involving strong evidence of discriminatory intent or animus—one might
question whether Harvard or UNC could fare any better.
163
See Alan Jenkins, Foxes Guarding the Chicken Coop: Intervention as of Right and the
Defense of Civil Rights Remedies, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 263, 307 (1999) (explaining that
successful remedial defense requires university to “demonstrate a ‘strong basis in evidence
for [its] conclusion that remedial action was necessary’”); Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly WestFaulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV.
73, 82 (2010) (finding that Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), protected
“discriminatory testing that favors whites by doctrinally treating the City’s efforts to avoid
disparate impact liability as conclusive evidence of an impermissible racial motive that
violates the statute’s proscription against disparate treatment”).
164
See Khaled A. Beydoun & Erika K. Wilson, Reverse Passing, 64 UCLA L. REV. 282,
322 (2017) (“Because of the legal obstacles associated with articulating and maintaining a
race-conscious affirmative action program for purposes of remedying past discrimination,
those seeking to utilize a race-conscious affirmative action program are more likely to prevail
in court if they instead choose to articulate a desire to achieve diversity as the rationale for
such a program.”). A separate explanation is that remedial rationales force universities to
broadcast ugly institutional stories that could invite legal liability. See Feingold, supra note
114, at 57-60 (noting how “self-interest dissuades universities from gather [sic] facts that
might reveal unlawful racial discrimination. Similar motivation can dissuade universities
from endorsing theories of discrimination that, if legally cognizable, could implicate the
university”); Jenkins, supra note 163, at 307-08 (discussing how “Croson standard places
great weight on evidence that would raise an inference of liability against the government
under the Equal Protection Clause and 1964 Civil Rights Act” and how “that same showing
creates a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination against the affirmative action defendant
vis-à-vis excluded minorities”).
165
Harvard incorrectly asserts that student body diversity is the only compelling interest
available to defend race-conscious admissions. See Harvard’s Response to Motion to
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To begin, bridging past to present enables universities to tell a fuller story
about why race still matters.166 This act of truth-telling comprises an important
intervention in itself—particularly against the backdrop of a growing campaign
to erase the past through book bans and educational gag orders.167 When elite
schools deny or diminish the past’s imprint on the present they sacrifice more
than an opportunity to defend affirmative action. Such narratives also feed
regressive talking points that seek to legitimize existing inequality by locating
racism in an ignoble past.
But even as a matter of law, the remedial justification enjoys a stronger
constitutional mooring than other viable defenses—including the diversity
rationale.168 Even Justice Clarence Thomas, arguably the Court’s most vocal
Intervene at 5, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.,
308 F.R.D. 39 (D. Mass.), aff’d, 807 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2015) (No. 14-cv-14176) (“Harvard
has long sought to admit a diverse student body precisely because of the beneficial effects of
diversity that it has witnessed among its students from all backgrounds. . . . The compelling
interest that the Supreme Court has recognized as permitting universities to consider race in
admissions is the pursuit of diversity, not the remediation of past injustices.”). Some lower
federal courts have adopted this misplaced position, which appears to derive from imprecise
language in Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Fisher I opinion. See Memorandum and Order on
Proposed Defendant–Intervenor’s Motion to Intervene, 308 F.R.D. 39, 51 n.6 (2015) (“The
Court, however, has also suggested that a university may not employ racial classifications to
remediate past instances of discrimination or injustice, because a ‘university’s “broad mission
[of] education” is incompatible with making the “judicial, legislative, or administrative
findings of constitutional or statutory violations” necessary to justify remedial racial
classification.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). Reading Justice Kennedy’s
opinion in Fisher I alongside Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissent, the most plausible reading
is that Justice Kennedy was reiterating that “societal discrimination” does not justify
affirmative action—not that a university cannot employ race-conscious admissions to remedy
its own discrimination.
166
Tom Foreman Jr., UNC Protesters Cite Ongoing Frustrations Amid Tenure Dispute,
U.S. NEWS (June 25, 2021, 10:28 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/northcarolina/articles/2021-06-25/amid-tenure-dispute-blacks-at-unc-cite-ongoing-frustrations
(noting demonstrators’ message of similarities between Black students’ treatment on campus
in 2021 and that of Black people in 1619 in context of protest around failure to grant NikoleHannah Jones tenure).
167
See Jeffrey Sachs, Scope and Speed of Educational Gag Orders Worsening Across the
Country, PEN AM. (Dec. 13, 2021), https://pen.org/scope-speed-educational-gag-ordersworsening-across-country/ [https://perma.cc/LG24-HAFL] (observing trend of state bills
restricting education on race, sex, and gender throughout U.S. schools and state agencies);
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, King Was an Early Critical Race Theorist, L.A. TIMES Jan. 17,
2022, at A1 (“[CRT] has become the target of coordinated efforts to stigmatize and erase
generations of antiracist knowledge, advocacy and history. The objective is both to disappear
antiracism’s history and to deny its contemporary salience.”).
168
See Jenkins, supra note 163, at 323 n.221 (“[Croson and Adarand] reaffirmed . . . that
‘government bodies . . . may constitutionally employ racial classifications essential to remedy
unlawful treatment of racial or ethnic groups subject to discrimination.’” (quoting United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987)).
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affirmative action opponent, recognizes that the remedial justification remains
constitutionally sound:
[T]he Court has recognized that the government has a compelling interest
in remedying past discrimination for which it is responsible, but we have
stressed that a government wishing to use race must provide a “strong basis
in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action [is] necessary.”169
It is one thing for Justice Thomas to identify a valid theoretical defense and
another for him to uphold an affirmative action policy on that basis. Only a naïve
reader would confuse Justice Thomas’s endorsement of the remedial rationale
with an earnest commitment to uphold affirmative action when a record reveals
past discrimination.170 That said, there is little reason to believe the diversity
rationale—where Harvard and UNC place their litigation eggs—will fare any
better before the current Court.
In short, the remedial rationale offers a doctrinal anchor to invoke and
implicate histories of racial exclusion that compromise racial inclusion in the
present.171 By extension, litigation affords universities an elevated platform to
publicly address their own legacies of racialized segregation and
subordination—thereby countering narratives that deny how racism shaped our
past and shapes our present.172
Neither Harvard nor UNC have embraced this opportunity. In fact, both have
resisted intervenor attempts to develop a record necessary to support a remedial
defense.173 This reluctance to highlight the past is not limited to today’s
169

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 317 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
170
See Samuel Issacharoff, Law and Misdirection in the Debate over Affirmative Action,
2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 11, 12-13 (2002) (“Even then, it was clear that the defense of an
ongoing legal obligation to take affirmative steps to integrate a particular university’s student
body was undoubtedly limited to a very small subset of the leading institutions that engage in
affirmative action. Moreover, as reflected in the recent University of Georgia litigation, even
once-segregated institutions are increasingly removed from that formal discriminatory past.”).
171
The District Court, relying on an intervenor’s expert witness, noted that UNC’s
discriminatory past might support its admissions policy. Notably, the court linked this
evidence to the diversity rationale. See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C.,
567 F. Supp. 3d 580, 590 n.5 (M.D.N.C. 2021) (“[The intervenor’s] expert report—which
details UNC’s reckoning with race over the full course of its history and illuminates the
history of racial discrimination in North Carolina’s K-12 public schools—is an important
contribution to the Court’s understanding of the context of this case.”), cert. granted, 142 S.
Ct. 896 (2022).
172
How a university discusses racism can constitute an important intervention. See Adam
Harris, This Is the End of Affirmative Action: What Are We Going to Do About It?, ATLANTIC
(July 26, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2021/09/the-end-ofaffirmative-action/619488/ (describing introspective projects at elite universities).
173
The UNC intervenors sought to “present evidence showing that UNC-Chapel Hill’s
current admissions policy is necessary in part because it helps remedy the long history of
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affirmative action litigants; university defendants have long resisted intervenor
efforts to foreground the university’s own history of racial discrimination.174
To concretize how foregrounding the past can buttress the case for affirmative
action in the present, I turn to UNC, whose history of de jure segregation and
desegregation resistance invites a remedial defense.175
Prior to 1951,176 the UNC system formally barred Black students from every
campus.177 In 1951, student plaintiffs prevailed in litigation that forced UNC to
segregation and discrimination in North Carolina, including within the University itself.”
Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion to Intervene at
15, Students for Fair Admissions v. Univ. of N.C., 319 F.R.D. 490 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (No. 14cv-00954); see also id. (“This [unfavorable] outcome could result if the Court does not
consider or weigh . . . the history of discrimination at UNC-Chapel Hill, the inextricable link
between that history and UNC’s current compelling interest in student body diversity, and the
adverse effect that elements of the current admissions process have on the diversity of the
student population.”).
174
See William C. Kidder, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Recent Developments
in Litigation, Admissions and Diversity Research, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 173, 175 (2001)
(“Despite these clear conflicts of interest, [regarding affirmative action between students of
color and universities] and while for decades leading scholars and advocates have recognized
the importance of student intervention in affirmative action cases, it has been a real struggle
to get minority student voices heard.”); see also Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1244 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Although UGA argues loosely that its use of race
is ‘supported’ by the university’s history of discrimination, UGA does not identify
remediating past discrimination as the compelling interest justifying its policy; indeed, it has
repeatedly disavowed that interest.”).
175
For records detailing UNC’s desegregation resistance, see Desegregation of the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill: Archival Resources, UNC UNIV. LIBS.,
https://guides.lib.unc.edu/desegregation-unc/archival [https://perma.cc/FWV4-Q4EC] (last
updated May. 4, 2022, 5:32 PM) (noting how in 1970, UNC was “in violation of the 1964
Civil Rights Act for maintaining a racially dual system of public higher education”).
176
The following overview is inexhaustive. Among other limitations, I focus on
admissions policies in the years following Brown v. Board of Education. Excluded, in turn,
are myriad manifestations of racial discrimination at UNC and the surrounding area. See
Daniel H. Pollitt, Legal Problems in Southern Desegregation: The Chapel Hill Story, 43 N.C.
L. REV. 689, 691 (1965) (commenting that in 1963 “[t]he three motels (although not the
University-owned Carolina Inn), the only bowling alley, all the barbershops except the one
located in the campus student union, approximately a third of the restaurants (especially those
ringing the town), two grocery stores fronting the highways leading into the community, and
several service stations were segregated; some with ‘White Only’ signs in prominent
display”). Moreover, my focus omits UNC’s much longer legacy of white supremacy—
including the university’s entanglement with, and support for, the Confederacy and slavery.
See generally GEETA N. KAPUR, TO DRINK FROM THE WELL: THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY AT THE NATION’S OLDEST PUBLIC UNIVERSITY (2020) (introducing work as
exposing long-concealed and dark history of university).
177
Donna L. Nixon, The Integration of UNC-Chapel Hill—Law School First, 97 N.C. L.
REV. 1741, 1742 (2019) (describing battle to admit five Black students to UNC School of
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admit Black students to its law school and medical school.178 Yet this decision
was limited; it neither compelled nor prompted corresponding changes across
the state’s public university system. Even after Brown v. Board of Education,179
which prohibited de jure segregation in public schools, UNC continued to bar
students of color from its undergraduate campuses.180 This resistance occurred
in the face of public protest and legal challenges.181
Not until 1955, following a federal court order, did UNC formally desegregate
its undergraduate campuses.182 But abolishing de jure segregation did not
translate to racial inclusion. Among other factors, UNC’s leadership lacked a
commitment to remedy the university’s legacy of racial segregation.183 In fact,

Law, noting “their enrollment and attendance at [UNC School of Law] was the result of years
of effort to desegregate higher education in the United States”).
178
See McKissick v. Carmichael, 187 F.2d 949, 950 (4th Cir. 1951) (reversing dismissal
of case seeking injunction prohibiting UNC School of Law from denying admission to Black
applicants); Oscar Diggs and James N. Slade, THE CAROLINA STORY: A VIRTUAL MUSEUM OF
UNIVERSITY HISTORY, https://museum.unc.edu/exhibits/show/medschool/oscar-diggs-andjames-n--slade [https://perma.cc/J7YU-GAAG] (last visited Oct. 25, 2022) (“Anticipating a
similar ruling for the medical school, the trustees removed racial barriers to admission there.
Later that year, Oscar Diggs . . . enrolled as the first African American in the medical
school.”).
179
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of public education the
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”).
180
Frasier v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of N.C., 134 F. Supp. 589, 590 (M.D.N.C. 1955),
aff’d, 350 U.S. 979 (1956) (per curiam).
181
Id. (challenging UNC’s orders denying undergraduate admission to university). A 1955
statement from UNC’s Board of Trustees captures the university’s commitment to racial
exclusion: “The State of North Carolina having spent millions of dollars in providing adequate
and equal educational facilities in the undergraduate departments of its institutions of higher
learning for all races, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Board of Trustees of the
Consolidated University of North Carolina that applications of Negroes to the undergraduate
schools of the three branches of the Consolidated University be not accepted.” Id.
182
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of N.C. v. Frasier, 350 U.S. 979, 979 (1956) (per curiam); see
also Hannah McMillan, Challenging Jim Crow: Desegregation at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2 TRACES 112, 123 (2013).
183
JENNIFER B. AYSCUE, BRIAN WOODWARD, JOHN KUCSERA & GENEVIEVE SIEGELHAWLEY, CIV. RTS. PROJECT/PROYECTO DERECHOS CIVILES, SEGREGATION AGAIN: NORTH
CAROLINA’S TRANSITION FROM LEADING DESEGREGATION THEN TO ACCEPTING SEGREGATION
NOW 2 (2014), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-anddiversity/segregation-again-north-carolina2019s-transition-from-leading-desegregationthen-to-accepting-segregation-now/Ayscue-Woodward-Segregation-Again-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B45N-NPBU] (“Unlike other Southern states that used more overtly defiant
tactics to oppose the federal government, North Carolina’s state and local politicians
implemented a subtle legal strategy to delay integration as long as possible.”).
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in the decades since Brown, one could argue that UNC has done more to resist
desegregation than to achieve integration.184
Throughout the 1960s, North Carolina resisted desegregation through a
strategy of “moderation.”185 Breaking from other post-Confederate states that
outright defied federal mandates, North Carolina’s white elite employed a
subtler approach that privileged token representation and moderated rhetoric.186
Moderation proved an effective strategy.187 As late as 1969, fifteen years after
Brown and five years after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964,188
UNC remained, in all meaningful respects, an all-white institution.189
184
North Carolina has a more nuanced history of desegregation at the K-12 level, in which
the state saw meaningful racial integration before a period of resegregation. See id. at xi
(noting resegregation of North Carolina schools, stating “North Carolina, a state that has long
prided itself on its educational success, no longer lays claim to successfully desegregated
schooling”). But even the period of increased racial integration is a mixed story; it often
involved the closure of successful Black schools and the termination of successful Black
educators. See Irving Joyner, Pimping Brown v. Board of Education: The Destruction of
African-American Schools and the Mis-Education of African-American Students, 35 N.C.
CENT. L. REV. 160, 194 (2013) (“From 1963 to 1970, the number of Black principals in the
state’s elementary schools plunged from 620 to only 170. Even more striking, 209 Black
principals headed secondary schools in 1963, but less than 10 still held that crucial job in
1970. By 1973, only three had survived this wholesale displacement.” (quoting DAVID S.
CECELSKI, ALONG FREEDOM ROAD: HYDE COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA AND THE FATE OF
BLACK SCHOOLS IN THE SOUTH 8 (1994))).
185
See Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation: Desegregating the South
During the Decade After Brown, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 92, 98 (1994) (“[T]he concept of
‘moderation’ in the post-Brown South, particularly in North Carolina, was a malleable
concept, skillfully used to deflect widespread pupil integration. Resistance to Brown was far
more spectacular in the defiant southern states such as Virginia and Louisiana, but equally
effective in states such as North Carolina that understood the value of tokenism and appeals
to moderation.”).
186
See Braxton Craven, Jr., Legal and Moral Aspects of the Lunch Counter Protests,
CHAPEL HILL WKLY., Apr. 28, 1960, at 1B. Even before Brown, North Carolina’s legislature
had opened an all-Black law school for the express purpose of excluding Black students from
its flagship schools. Nixon, supra note 177, at 1756-57 (citation omitted) (“The unaccredited
North Carolina College School of Law was . . . the only institution open to African Americans
for enrollment. It was specifically created . . . to avoid integrating Carolina Law, the state’s
flagship university . . . .”); see Joyner, supra note 184, at 169.
187
See Douglas, supra note 185, at 98 (noting how moderation was “skillfully used to
deflect widespread pupil integration”).
188
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits entities receiving federal funding
from discriminating based on race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (“No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
189
See Hist. Dep’t of N.C. State Univ., Fluctuating Commitment, STATE OF HIST.,
https://soh.omeka.chass.ncsu.edu/exhibits/show/colorline-hew/hewcommitment
[https://perma.cc/8LB2-J3QE] (last visited Oct. 25, 2022).
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Even if initially effective, UNC’s efforts to evade desegregation mandates
never escaped public scrutiny. Buoyed by the Civil Rights Movement, local
stakeholders and organizations pressed the federal government to enforce
antidiscrimination law.190 In 1969, the Nixon administration ordered North
Carolina and nine other states to develop desegregation plans.191 Rather than
comply, UNC joined four states that “ignored the request because they realized
that Nixon did not plan to enforce consequences for failing to comply.”192 The
following year, Nixon’s Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(“HEW”)193 advised UNC that failing to remedy its legacy of de jure segregation
violated Title VI.194 The agency’s complaint initiated a decade of negotiation
between UNC and the federal government.195 This stalemate ended in 1979,
when the Carter Administration—which revived Executive Branch
commitments to civil rights enforcement—announced its intent to terminate
roughly $90 million in federal funding to UNC.196
The threat was short-lived. In 1981, Ronald Reagan entered the White House
and brought with him an education philosophy more sympathetic to
desegregation resistance than desegregation itself. That year, UNC and Reagan’s
Department of Education entered a settlement to govern desegregation across
the UNC system.197 The settlement ended the eleven-year legal dispute.198 It did
not, however, convince local civil rights leaders that North Carolina would
desegregate its public universities. The skepticism was warranted. Beyond
lacking specific requirements, the agreement was negotiated in secret and
190

Id.
Id.
192
Id.
193
In 1979, HEW was split into the Department of Health and Human Services and the
Department of Education. See United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare
Records, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, https://www.jfklibrary.org/assetviewer/archives/USDHEW [https://perma.cc/35YD-726P] (last visited Oct. 25, 2022).
194
See David W. Bishop, The Consent Decree Between the University of North Carolina
System and the U.S. Department of Education, 1981-82, 52 J. NEGRO EDUC. 350, 353 (1983)
(“Toward the end of 1969, [the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights] decided
that ten states were operating segregated systems of higher education in violation of Title VI.
HEW finally sent letters to those ten states requesting that they devise statewide plans to
desegregate and integrate their dual systems of higher education.”).
195
In 1973, UNC submitted a desegregation plan that called for enhanced recruitment,
remedial programming, and an antidiscrimination policy, among other provisions. Nixon’s
Department of HEW rejected the plan for lacking specific admissions goals or plans for
execution. See id.
196
See Hist. Dep’t of N.C. State Univ., Consent Decree, 1979-1981, THE STATE OF HIST.,
https://soh.omeka.chass.ncsu.edu/exhibits/show/colorline-hew/hewconsentdecree
[https://perma.cc/3RZJ-FJJM] (last visited Oct. 25, 2022); see also Bishop, supra note 194,
at 353 (noting that North Carolina had $90 million in federal funding on the line).
197
Bishop, supra note 194, at 350.
198
Id.
191
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facilitated by North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms—a stalwart segregationist.199
David S. Tatel, who led the Office of Civil Rights at HEW during the Carter
Administration, offered a candid reaction:
This is the first really major action the new administration has taken in the
civil rights field, and it shows they’re not interested in enforcing the civil
rights laws that prohibit segregation in education . . . . This settlement
doesn’t read like a desegregation plan. It reads like a joint U.S.-North
Carolina defense of everything the system did.200
Elliott C. Lichtman, who prepared multiple NAACP briefs over the preceding
decade, offered a similar take. Lichtman termed the agreement “‘a triple end run’
around federal courts in Washington, civil rights laws and the Constitution.”201
In sum, for nearly three decades after Brown v. Board of Education,202 North
Carolina’s white political class defied federal orders to integrate its public
university campuses. Federal confrontation ended in 1981, but only through a
closed-door negotiation between outspoken segregationists and a sympathetic
administration.
A brief review of UNC’s racial demographics adds texture to this partial
history.203 Before Brown, UNC formally barred Black students from its
campuses.204 In the four years following Brown, UNC’s undergraduate Black
199
The New York Times portrayed the consent decree as follows: “But the agreement does
not require the state university system, which includes 16 campuses, to dismantle programs
at white schools to eliminate duplication of programs, as the Carter Administration had
demanded. The agreement was worked out in secret negotiations at the same time the
Government was taking the state to court in a suit that could have cost North Carolina $90
million in Federal education aid. . . . Mr. Bell credited Senator Jesse Helms, Republican of
North Carolina, with helping to start the negotiations with North Carolina officials. He said
Mr. Helms had told them of Mr. Bell’s interest and that secret talks were conducted through
Douglas Bennett, a Washington lawyer.” Carolina Settles Integration Suit on Universities,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1981, at 22.
200
Charles R. Babcock, U.S. Accepted Desegregation Plan Once Rejected for N.C.
Colleges,
WASH.
POST
(July
11,
1981),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/07/11/us-accepted-desegregationplan-once-rejected-for-nc-colleges/3e4c542b-40b8-405f-8cc9-a46952035b0f/.
201
See id. (stating also that NAACP would challenge the consent decree); see also Bishop,
supra note 194, at 359 (“The LDF concluded that the Decree totally lacked ‘commitments to
meet specific requirements of the desegregation “Criteria” . . . .’”).
202
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
203
Institutional demographic statistics never tell a complete story. Still, these figures add
depth to UNC’s legacy of racial exclusion. As a point of reference, North Carolina’s
population is roughly 22% Black, a baseline that the State has employed to measure racial
inclusion within its universities. See QuickFacts North Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July
1, 2021), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/NC [https://perma.cc/EV8K-5MAY].
204
See Nicholas Graham, Historic African American Enrollment at UNC, UNC UNIV.
LIBRS. (Apr. 21, 2016), https://blogs.lib.unc.edu/hill/2016/04/21/historic-african-american-
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student population never exceeded seven students (or 0.14% percent of the entire
undergraduate student population).205 By 1974, amid federal litigation,
undergraduate Black enrollment reached nearly 700 students (surpassing 5% of
the student body).206
UNC’s percentage of Black students peaked in 2011, at 9.2% of the
undergraduate campus population.207 This figure represents a significant
increase from thirty-five years prior, when the State settled with Reagan’s
Department of Education. Still, in a state that is over 20% Black, that peak
reflects UNC’s inability to rectify a legacy of racial exclusion. In the decade
since, UNC’s Black student population declined to a low of 7.6% in 2018.208 In
2014, the year SFFA sued UNC, that number was 7.9%.209
The foregoing provides a partial picture of UNC’s exclusionary history. Yet
it exceeds the picture UNC has presented throughout the litigation. Fortunately,
UNC’s legacy of exclusion is not wholly absent from the case.210
Notwithstanding UNC’s resistance, student intervenors secured the right to
share a more comprehensive account. Through their advocacy, the intervenors
reveal how UNC could have marshaled a more capacious remedial defense that
ties past to present.211 This starts with the intervenors’ basic framing of the case:

enrollment-at-unc/ [https://perma.cc/QLK2-PAR4] (“African American students joined the
undergraduate population in 1955.”).
205
See id.
206
See id.
207
Graham, supra note 204.
208
Analytic Reports: Student Characteristics, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL OFF. OF
INSTITUTIONAL RSCH. & ASSESSMENT, https://oira.unc.edu/reports/ [https://perma.cc/ZQ25G8T7] (last visited Oct. 25, 2022). To view the relevant student characteristics statistic,
navigate to the “Diversity” tab, select “Student Characteristics,” choose “2018” from the
“Select Calendar Year” dropdown menu, choose “Fall” from the “Select Term Type”
dropdown menu, and finally, select “(All)” from the “Select Student Level” dropdown menu.
209
Id. To view the relevant student characteristics statistic, navigate to the “Diversity” tab,
select “Student Characteristics,” choose “2014” from the “Select Calendar Year” dropdown
menu, choose “Fall” from the “Select Term Type” dropdown menu, and finally, select “(All)”
from the “Select Student Level” dropdown menu.
210
UNC’s only reference to the Consent Decree is for definitional purposes. See
Defendant-Intervenors’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9, Students for
Fair Admissions v. Univ. of N.C., 319 F.R.D. 490 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (No. 1:14-cv-00954).
UNC does not, for example, explain the conditions that permitted the consent decree’s
adoption, the decades of desegregation resistance it followed, nor the desegregation resistance
it enabled.
211
See id. at 2-3 (“Unrebutted evidence demonstrates that while UNC has made strides in
harnessing the benefits of diversity, Black, Latinx, and Native American students continue to
experience tokenism, false stereotypes, racial isolation, and overt racial hostility on UNC’s
campus. These dynamics require UNC’s ongoing attention to both numeric representation and
contextual factors that shape the campus climate.”).

2022]

COLORBLIND CAPTURE

1993

[A] “race-blind” . . . admissions process would produce a range of harms.
Such harms would include: . . . lessening the diversity within each racial
group, thereby entrenching racial stereotypes; exacerbating racial isolation
among students who are already among the most marginalized on UNC’s
campus; and undermining their leadership and collective efforts to counter
the lingering effects of racial discrimination on campus.212
To support their argument, the intervenors tie contemporary racial hostility
and incidents of anti-Black racism to North Carolina’s “sordid history of state
sponsored racial discrimination, which includes excluding African-American
and other students of color from UNC-Chapel Hill.”213 The intervenors
emphasized that even after court-ordered integration, “UNC’s leadership turned
a blind eye to the discrimination experience by those same students once
admitted.”214 The intervenors further relay how UNC’s institutional culture
continues to stymie the full participation of students of color.215 This culture is
linked to individual acts of bias, the presence of confederate relics, and visits by
white nationalists.216 Against this backdrop, the intervenors contend that
“[w]hile UNC publicly rejects its prior legacy of racial discrimination and has
made some progress in removing and renaming confederate relics, . . . UNC’s
historical context has present-day manifestations that make students of color
feel unwelcome on UNC’s campus.”217
To be clear, there is no reason to believe that this conclusion or the evidence
on which it relies could sway a hostile court. Still, this story is significant;
without understanding UNC’s racial past, it is impossible to understand UNC’s
racial present. In short, this historical account enables a more honest,
comprehensive, and colorconscious story about race’s role in UNC’s admissions
process today. Unlike UNC, the intervenors defend affirmative action as a
modest antidote to ongoing racial harms inseparable from an institutional legacy
of racial exclusion.
2. During Admissions: Racially Defective Measures of “Merit”
Above, I outlined how an institution’s historical legacy of racial exclusion
continues to shape the present. Next, I explore how race matters in the present.
Specifically, I examine how facially neutral criteria systematically understate
the existing academic qualifications of students from negatively stereotyped
212

Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
Id. at 41.
214
Id. at 41-42.
215
See id. at 64 (“UNC’s past history does not stand in isolation. The record is abundantly
clear that to this day, issues of race, white supremacy, and the historic legacy of slavery and
Jim Crow discrimination continue to pervade UNC’s campus environment, impacting the
University’s ability to harness the educational benefits that flow from student body
diversity.”).
216
See id. at 42-43.
217
See id. at 43-44 (emphasis added).
213
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racial groups. This insight undergirds the claim that affirmative action counters
concrete and quantifiable racial advantages that flow to white applicants during
the admissions process.
Elsewhere, I have detailed how standard measures of “merit”—e.g.,
standardized tests, grades, interviews—tend to understate the academic “merit”
of students of color.218 The underlying scholarship underscores a critical
observation: a portion of perceived achievement “gaps” is illusory.219 Instead of
capturing actual differences in preparation, ability, or motivation, a substantial
portion of “achievement gaps” reflects measurement errors that artificially
inflate the relative merit of white students.220
This is not a “pipeline” story that attributes the underrepresentation of Black
and Latinx students to past discrimination (e.g., racially disparate access to wellresourced K-12 schools).221 Rather, this is a story about universities privileging

218
See Jonathan Feingold, Note, Racing Towards Color-Blindness: Stereotype Threat and
the Myth of Meritocracy, 3 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSPS. 231, 233 (2011)
(examining stereotype threat impact on performance on the Law School Admission Test ( and
in law school); see also Sam Erman & Gregory M. Walton, Stereotype Threat and
Antidiscrimination Law: Affirmative Steps to Promote Meritocracy and Racial Equality in
Education, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 312, 324 (2015) (explaining that common measures of
intellectual ability underestimate minority students’ potential because pervasive negative
intellectual stereotypes cause distraction and anxiety that impede academic achievement);
Carbado, supra note 20, at 1146-47 (citations omitted) (“There is some, albeit imperfect,
evidence that implicit biases [and stereotype threat] . . . impact[], to the detriment of students
of color, critical admissions criteria and decisions, including: (1) the content of letters of
recommendation; (2) assessment of resumes; (3) evaluation of writing samples; (4) student
performance on standardized tests; (5) grading; (6) mentoring; and (7) class placement
decisions.”).
219
See Christine R. Logel, Gregory M. Walton, Steven J. Spencer, Jennifer Peach & Zanna
P. Mark, Unleashing Latent Ability: Implications of Stereotype Threat for College
Admissions, 47 EDUC. PSYCH. 42, 43 (2012); Feingold, infra note 232, at 98 (“[A] portion of
perceived group-based differences across educational settings is often illusory, a consequence
of psychological harms that obscure the actual, but ‘latent,’ ability of negatively stereotyped
students.”).
220
This story of discrimination is narrow. It does not, for example, implicate intersecting
structural dynamics (e.g., the relationship between housing segregation and educational
resources) and individual behavior (e.g., teacher expectations) that shape a student’s
educational trajectory before the moment of admissions. See Carbado, supra note 20, at 113943.
221
More broadly, “pipeline” theories assume that certain groups (e.g., Black students)
remain underrepresented in employment or educational domains because they are
underqualified relative to groups that are overrepresented (e.g., white students). See Kristen
Monroe & William Chiu, Gender Equality in the Academy: The Pipeline Problem, 43 POL.
SCI. & POL. 303, 303 (2010) (“The image of a pipeline is a commonly advanced explanation
for persistent discrimination that suggests gender inequality will decline once there are
sufficient numbers of qualified women in the hiring pool.”). Narratives that attribute racial
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fraught measures of “merit” that, in practice, subject students of color to unequal
treatment by understating their true academic qualifications.222 When
universities fail to correct for fraught metrics, they confer racial advantages to
wealthy white students. Affirmative action, by countering those racial
advantages, promotes a more objective, individualized, and race-neutral process.
Notably, this counterpreference framing enjoys a doctrinal hook. In Bakke,
Justice Powell made the following observation:
Racial classifications in admissions conceivably could serve a fifth
purpose . . . : fair appraisal of each individual’s academic promise in the
light of some cultural bias in grading or testing procedures. To the extent
that race and ethnic background were considered only to the extent of
curing established inaccuracies in predicting academic performance, it
might be argued that there is no “preference” at all.223
In the decades since Bakke, social scientists from a range of disciplines have
confirmed Justice Powell’s insight.224 Yet with minor exception, affirmative
action advocates have not harnessed this counterpreference framing—even

disparities in admissions to racialized resource gaps are not, in whole, wrong. But they tend
to (1) reproduce the pernicious presumption that Black students are less capable and talented
than their white counterparts and (2) conflate racial (dis)advantage with class (dis)advantage.
See Jonathan P. Feingold, Deficit Frame Dangers, 37 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1235, 1249-50, 125860 (2021). Among other consequences, “pipeline” stories can reinforce the unfounded claim
that middle-class status inoculates students of color from racial disadvantage. See generally
Jonathan P. Feingold, Equal Protection Design Defects, 91 TEMPLE L. REV. 513, 530, 537
(2019) (exploring the intersection of class and race in university admissions and arguing that
class-based admissions serve neither poor white people nor people of color).
222
Standard measures of merit are most likely to understate the existing talent of students
from “the academic vanguard of their group”—that is, students who are race disadvantaged
but class privileged. Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape
Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCH. 613, 617 (1997); see also Camille
Lamar Campbell, Getting at the Root Instead of the Branch: Extinguishing the Stereotype of
Black Intellectual Inferiority in American Education, A Long-Ignored Transitional Justice
Project, 38 LAW & INEQ. 1, 54 (2020) (“Paradoxically, highly-motivated students who are
most invested in academics and whose academic engagement should enhance their
performance are most vulnerable to stereotype threat.”).
223
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 n.43 (1978) (emphasis added).
224
Justice Powell relegated this insight to a single footnote, in part, because U.C. Davis
did not invoke the counterpreference argument—an omission that tracked U.C. Davis’s
ambivalence toward its own policy. See DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 87, at 32.
Available evidence supporting a counterpreference frame included many of U.C. Davis’s own
students, who achieved great academic success at U.C. Davis but would not have been
admitted based on standard admissions considerations. See id. at 46, 74-75. Moreover, U.C.
Davis never disclosed that the Medical School Dean employed a discretionary list—a practice
through which the Dean approved the admission of roughly five (out of 100) wealthy and
well-connected students per admissions cycle who would not have been admitted otherwise.
See id. at 24, 47.
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though it reinforces the constitutional and moral case for affirmative action and
dovetails with the Colorconscious Story.
To see how a university might mobilize this counterpreference framing, I now
turn to Harvard.225 To begin, we might ask whether Harvard considers criteria
likely to compromise a “fair appraisal” of an applicant’s “academic promise.”
At least three stand out: (1) standardized test scores;226 (2) teacher and counselor
recommendations; and (3) alumni interviews.227
We can start with standardized tests.228 Decades of research confirm that
racial performance gaps cannot be fully explained by differences in preparation,
motivation, or resources.229 A significant portion results from environmental
forces such as stereotype threat, a psychological phenomenon that depresses the
performance of high-achieving individuals in domains where their group faces
a negative stereotype.230
Stereotype threat’s impact is concrete and quantifiable. According to two
meta-analyses, stereotype threat may account for roughly one-fifth of a standard

225
Albeit underdeveloped, the student intervenors mobilized counterpreference frames in
the Harvard and UNC litigation. See Defendant-Intervenors’ Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at 17, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 319 F.R.D.
490 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (No. 1:14-cv-00954) (“Race-[c]onscious [a]dmissions [a]llows UNC to
[a]ccount for [i]nequalities and [b]etter [a]ssess a [s]tudent’s [p]otential.”); Harvard
Intervenors Posttrial Brief, supra note 48, at 10 (“Traditional admissions criteria
systematically undervalue the potential contributions of racial minorities . . . . The ability to
consider race allows admissions officers to counterbalance the racial skew in admissions
criteria and academic opportunities.”).
226
In December 2021, Harvard announced that standardized test scores would be an
optional component of an applicant’s application through 2026. See Nick Anderson, Harvard
Won’t Require SAT or ACT Through 2026 as Test-Optional Push Grows, WASH. POST (Dec.
16, 2021, 7:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2021/12/16/harvard-testoptional-college-admissions/. This places Harvard alongside a growing number of
universities that have reduced or eliminated reliance on standardized test scores. See id.
227
Race arguably influences every criterion upon which Harvard relies. See Carbado,
supra note 20, at 1145 (“Negative action can manifest itself not only in ‘hard’ evaluative
measures, such as standardized test scores and grades, but also in ‘soft’ evaluative measures,
such as leadership experience, awards, extracurricular opportunities, internships, and letters
of recommendation.”). I have limited the Article’s focus to the three identified criteria to
manage scope.
228
Grades are susceptible to similar race-based measurement errors. See Brief for Legal
Scholars Defending Race-Conscious Admissions as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
27, SFFA v. Harvard III, 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022) (No. 20-01199).
229
See Steele, supra note 222, at 622 (“[S]tereotype threat may be a possible source of
bias in standardized tests, a bias that arises not from item content but from group differences
in the threat that societal stereotypes attach to test performance.”); see also Erman & Walton,
supra note 218, at 313.
230
See generally Kim Shayo Buchanan & Phillip Atiba Goff, Racist Stereotype Threat in
Civil Rights Law, 67 UCLA L. REV. 316 (2020).
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deviation in test performance.231 Translated to the SAT, this equates to roughly
sixty-three points on a 2,400-point test.232 Sixty-three points might appear
trivial, but it explains substantial portions of observed performance gaps.233
This literature betrays the common notion that standardized tests—whatever
their faults—provide an objective measure of student ability.234 Blind reliance
on these tests, in turn, deprives Black and Latinx students of a fair appraisal of
their true academic talent and potential. These tests confer a corresponding racial
advantage upon white applicants unencumbered by negative societal
stereotypes. Accordingly, if universities consider standardized test scores
without accounting for stereotype threat, that consideration functions as a racial
preference for white students. Race-conscious admissions offer a direct, if
imprecise, mechanism to counter that preference and realize a more meritocratic
selection process.
Beyond standardized tests, criteria that rely on subjective judgment present
similar fair measure concerns. This includes letters of recommendation and
alumni interviews—both of which can grant evaluators substantial discretion.
As a result, such criteria are vulnerable to implicit biases and racially disparate
treatment.235
Notably, implicit bias was identified as a potential source of disparate
treatment at Harvard. But concerns about implicit bias did not come from
Harvard—e.g., as a racial (dis)advantage that warrants a countermeasure like
affirmative action. Rather, SFFA cited implicit bias research to buttress its

231
See Gregory M. Walton & Steven J. Spencer, Latent Ability: Grades and Test Scores
Systematically Underestimate the Intellectual Ability of Negatively Stereotyped Students, 20
PSYCH. SCI. 1132, 1134-37 (2009).
232
See Jonathan P. Feingold, Hidden in Plain Sight: A More Compelling Case for
Diversity, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 59, 98 (2019).
233
Id.; see also Walton & Spencer, supra note 231, at 1137 (“The observed effect sizes
suggest that the SAT Math test underestimates the math ability of women like those in the
present sample by 19 to 21 points, and that the SAT Math and SAT Reading tests
underestimate the intellectual ability of African and Hispanic Americans like those in the
present sample by a total of 39 to 41 points for each group. Insofar as the overall gender gap
on the SAT Math test is 34 points and as the overall Black-White and Hispanic-White gaps
on the SAT (combining math and reading) are 199 and 148 points, respectively, these
differences are substantial.” (citation omitted)).
234
Feingold, supra note 111, at 530 (arguing that stereotype threat renders standardized
tests “susceptible to ‘uneven conditions’” because the tests “subject certain performers,
because of their race, to materially different conditions during performance (but fail to
account for this difference)”).
235
The district court noted that “teacher and guidance counselor recommendations
seemingly presented Asian Americans as having less favorable personal characteristics than
similarly situated non-Asian American applicants.” SFFA v. Harvard I, 397 F. Supp. 3d 126,
170 (D. Mass. 2019), aff’d, 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022).
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narrative of anti-Asian discrimination.236 According to SFFA, Harvard’s
“personal rating”—which incorporates teacher and guidance counselor
recommendations—invites racial stereotyping and has been the “downfall” of
many Asian American applicants.237
Harvard rejected SFFA’s allegations on factual and legal grounds. First,
Harvard denied that implicit biases infiltrate its process or otherwise subject
Asian American applicants to disparate treatment. Second, Harvard argued that
disparate treatment traceable to implicit biases or external sources (e.g., high
school guidance counselor letters) was not legally cognizable.238
At face value, the parties’ respective positions make sense. SFFA, the
plaintiff, alleges disparate treatment; Harvard, the defendant, objects. But if
SFFA wants to delegitimize affirmative action (its apparent goal), and Harvard
wants to fortify race-conscious admissions (its apparent goal), the preceding
arguments appear more awkward.239 By invoking implicit biases, SFFA is
articulating a structuralist story that locates racial bias within facially neutral
considerations. Put differently, when Harvard relies on the “personal rating”
without correcting a predictable measurement error that disadvantages Asian
Americans relative to white applicants, those white applicants receive an
unearned racial boost. Absent intervention—such as affirmative action—“white
students and [Asian American] students are not competing on even ground.”240
236
Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 25-26, Students for
Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 807 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2015)
(No. 14-14176) (“The United States has a long and tragic history of racial discrimination
against Asian Americans. Today, Asian Americans continue to face explicit and implicit
racial bias . . . . Admissions systems that rely on subjective criteria are susceptible to abuse,
including racial stereotyping and other forms of racial discrimination. Harvard’s personal
rating is especially susceptible to abuse because of its general subjectivity and because of
Harvard’s failure to take steps to guard against racial stereotyping.”). SFFA critiques Harvard
for failing to provide implicit bias training—which SFFA suggests is necessary because
implicit biases can manifest as “prejudices of which [admissions officers] are unaware” that
may “nonetheless play a large role in their evaluations of people and their work.” Id. at 28.
237
SFFA v. Harvard I, 397 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (“Because teacher and guidance counselor
recommendation letters are among the most significant inputs for the personal rating, the
apparent race-related or race-correlated difference in the strength of guidance counselor and
teacher recommendations is significant.”).
238
Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings, supra note 236, at 52.
239
Notably, the district court recognized multiple ways in which race infects the
admissions process (to the benefit of white applicants), yet never identified affirmaitve action
as a tool to counter that white racial advantage. SFFA v. Harvard I, 397 F. Supp. 3d at 202
n.62 (“Further, the Court feels confident stating that the statistical disparities in personal
ratings and admissions probabilities that have been identified are the result of some external
race-correlated factors and perhaps some slight implicit biases among some admissions
officers that, while regrettable, cannot be completely eliminated in a process that must rely on
judgments about individuals.”).
240
Carbado, supra note 19, at 1159 (describing inequities in admissions processes that do
not account for racial bias).
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SFFA’s implicit bias allegations opened the door for Harvard to defend
affirmative action as a countermeasure. Absent intervention, implicit biases
benefit students from societally favored groups (here, white students) and
disadvantage students from societally disfavored groups (here, Asian American
students). Race-conscious admissions could mitigate the unearned racial
advantage white students otherwise enjoy. Or, in Justice Powell’s words,
evidence of anti-Asian bias calls for a targeted, race-conscious countermeasure
to “cur[e] established inaccuracies in predicting academic performance” of
Asian American applicants.241 That race-conscious intervention, which
mitigates the bias laden within existing metrics, would constitute “no
‘preference’ at all.”242
Harvard could have embraced SFFA’s implicit bias story. Doing so would
have helped to exculpate affirmative action as the source of anti-Asian bias, even
if it implicated Harvard.243 Harvard did not take that approach, and instead
rejected claims of implicit bias. Perhaps strategic on the surface, this decision
compromises the case for Harvard’s own race-conscious admissions policy. By
discounting the presence and potential impact of implicit biases, Harvard
reinforced the view that facial neutrality equals racial neutrality. This claim
naturalizes the “preference framing” that already pervades public perceptions of
affirmative action. Moreover, Harvard enabled SFFA’s core narrative that
affirmative action is the source of anti-Asian bias.244
Before proceeding, it is worth uplifting how the counterpreference framing
defuses the oft-cited concern that affirmative action stigmatizes its

241

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 n.43 (1978).
Id. The district court comes closest to making this point. SFFA v. Harvard II, 980 F.3d
157, 202 (1st Cir. 2020) (“[T]o the extent that the disparities are the result of race, they are
unintentional and would not be cured by a judicial dictate that Harvard abandon
considerations of race in its admission process.”), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022).
243
Throughout this litigation, SFFA has argued that anti-Asian bias benefits white (and
often wealthy) students, not other students of color. See id. SFFA also cites facially neutral
components of Harvard’s admissions process as the source of anti-Asian bias. See id. The
lower courts identified multiple ways that race could have disadvantaged Asian Americans
vis-à-vis similarly situated white students. Letters of recommendation were part of the
explanation. SFFA v. Harvard I, 397 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (“[R]ace-correlated variation in
teacher and guidance counselor recommendations is likely a cause of at least part of the
disparity in the personal ratings.”). The courts posited multiple factors, from implicit biases
to the disproportionate concentration of Asian applicants in “public high schools where
overloaded teachers and guidance counselors may provide more perfunctory
recommendations.” SFFA v. Harvard II, 980 F.3d at 201; see also SFFA v. Harvard I, 397 F.
Supp. 3d at 202 (“[Lower scores] might be the result of qualitative factors that are harder to
quantify, such as teacher and guidance counselor recommendations, or they may reflect some
implicit biases.”).
244
See Feingold, supra note 153, at 719-28 (arguing that bias against Asian applicants is
a product of preferences for white students rather than for other students of color).
242
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beneficiaries.245 On the merits, this claim enjoys limited empirical support.246
For present purposes, I am most interested in how stigma concerns interact with
competing theories of race and racism.
Stigma arguments follow a basic logical progression: if an entity admits
underqualified members of a specific group, all group members are stigmatized
as intellectually inferior regardless of their individual qualifications.247 Even if
one accepts this premise, additional presumptions are required before one can
conclude that affirmative action produces stigma. Specifically, affirmative
action should produce stigma only if it contravenes an otherwise race-neutral,
objective, and meritocratic process. But if Harvard considers race to counter
racial (dis)advantages that otherwise lead to the admission of underqualified
white applicants, there would be no stigma concern. If anything, affirmative
action should be necessary to avoid the stigma that white students would
otherwise confront on Harvard’s campus.
We can concretize the above by returning to SFFA’s implicit bias concerns.
If Harvard knows that its personal rating (because of implicit biases) tends to
understate the existing merit of Asian American applicants relative to white
applicants, a policy that corrects that measurement error would not be a racial
preference for Asian American applicants. To the contrary, it would reduce a
racial preference for white applicants. If left unaddressed, that white racial
advantage would lead Harvard to admit less qualified white applicants over more
deserving Asian Americans.
If one endorses the stigma logic, the above scenario does not depict a system
free from stigma. Rather, it suggests that standard stigma arguments identify the
wrong victim and culprit. Because affirmative action often produces a more
meritocratic playing field, race-conscious policies reduce stigma, not produce
stigma. If anything, affirmative action would appear necessary to buffer white
students from the stigma that comes from an admissions program saturated with
white racial advantages.
245
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (outlining
concern that affirmative action stigmatizes Black students); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Emily
Houh & Mary Campbell, Cracking the Egg: Which Came First—Stigma or Affirmative
Action?, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1299, 1301-02 (2008) (“Proponents of this view identified both
internal stigma—doubt of one’s own qualifications—and external stigma—the burden of the
doubts of others in one’s qualifications—as reasons for dismantling affirmative action
programs.”).
246
The weight of evidence identifies racial stereotypes, not affirmative action, as the
source of stigma. See Onwuachi-Willig et al., supra note 245, at 1344 (“[W]ith respect to the
seven law schools we surveyed, it was not affirmative action that resulted in internal and/or
external stigma, but rather racial stereotypes that have attached historically to different
groups, regardless of affirmative action’s existence.”).
247
See john a. powell, Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism?, 86 DENV. U. L. REV.
785, 792 (2009) (“There is an assumption that racially targeted programs create white
resentment because there is a sense that whites who are playing by the rules are having things
taken from them and given to undeserving non-whites who do not play by the same rules.”).
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Harvard, for example, could have preemptively defused stigma arguments by
foregrounding the myriad race- and class-based (dis)advantages that benefit
wealthy white applicants. Doing so would help anchor the argument that
affirmative action yields a more individualized and meritocratic process. But
Harvard did the opposite. Rather than surface how race shapes its admissions
process, Harvard denied, discounted, and obscured race’s enduring relevance.
As a result, Harvard reproduced the very presumptions that legitimize and
rationalize enduring racial disparities on its own campus. And Harvard enabled
the colorblind logic that regressive forces have long weaponized to malign
antiracism itself.
3.

After Admissions: Racial Headwinds in the Classroom

Above, I outlined how universities could surface racial (dis)advantages that
arise before and during the admissions process. Here, I shift the frame forward
and outline how affirmative action promotes racial neutrality after admissions.
Harvard and UNC identify student body diversity as the interest their raceconscious practices serve. This makes sense. In 2016, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that the Fourteenth Amendment permits universities to employ
narrowly tailored race-conscious policies designed to ensure a diversity student
body.248 Even so, the diversity rationale remains far from secure—particularly
given a new rightwing majority open to revisiting and overturning existing
precedent.249 For this reason alone, it is worrisome that Harvard and UNC have
marshaled a shallow theory of diversity susceptible to predictable but avoidable
critique.250 Specifically, the university defendants understate why racial
diversity matters on campus. As a result, Harvard and UNC reinforce a formalist
vision of race and racism that understates racial diversity’s value in higher
education and beyond.
To see what a more robust diversity story might entail, we can start by
reviewing standard diversity critiques from the Right and Left. On the Right, a
common claim is that racial diversity’s educational benefits—to the extent they
exist—are limited to subjects that directly implicate race. Racial diversity might
matter in an ethnic studies class or Asian American history class, but not in a

248
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 579 U.S. 365, 367 (2016); see also Feingold, supra note
232, at 60.
249
Even if the diversity rationale survives in form, the Supreme Court could render it
unavailable in practice. Justice Samuel Alito’s Fisher dissent offers a model for how this
might occur. See id. at 2227 (“Neither [University of Texas (“UT”)] nor the majority has
demonstrated that any of these four [diversity-related] goals provides a sufficient basis for
satisfying strict scrutiny. And UT’s arguments to the contrary depend on a series of invidious
assumptions.”).
250
Moreover, elite universities have resources to support existing arguments by funding
research that examines and identifies the benefits of student body diversity. See, e.g., Adam
Chilton, Justin Driver, Jonathan S. Masur & Kyle Rozema, Assessing Affirmative Action’s
Diversity Rationale, 122 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 331 (2022).
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physics or math class.251 On the Left, a resonant concern is that diversity—as a
concept and practice—decouples race from racism in ways that privilege the
interests, comfort, and learning of institutional insiders (who often are white,
male, and cisgendered).252 The concern is that diversity commitments reinforce
the status quo by obscuring how race shapes institutional environments and
experiences therein.
On the surface, these critiques share little in common. They cohere, however,
in two respects. First, a common conception of diversity infuses both. Advocates
herald diversity for multiple reasons.253 But the dominant vision of diversity
remains a “marketplace of ideas” story that views diversity as a tool to promote
discourse in the classroom.254 One can think of this as the First Amendment case
for diversity: student body diversity yields more perspectives, which facilitates
more learning for all.
Albeit dominant, this First Amendment diversity story invites predictable
critique—including the foregoing concerns from the Right and the Left.255 To
meet these concerns, it behooves advocates to offer a multifaceted diversity
story. This can occur by linking diversity’s discourse benefits to diversity’s
equality function.256 As I and others have detailed, racial diversity is essential
because it buffers students of color against a host of environmental headwinds
that can compromise their right to “equal university membership.”257
251

See Rachel D. Godsil, Why Race Matters in Physics Class, 64 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 40, 62-63 (2016).
252
See Jonathan P. Feingold, Diversity Drift, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 14 (2019).
253
Compare Thomas H. Lee, University Dons and Warrior Chieftains: Two Concepts of
Diversity, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2305 (2004) (“What I have called ‘discourse’ benefits
are the core ‘educational benefits’ of student body diversity, and they are, unsurprisingly,
grounded in ‘the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university
environment.’”), with Charles R. Lawrence, III, Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper
Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 765 (1997) (“But I believe that this distinction is
misconceived. The diversity rationale is inseparable from the purpose of remedying our
society’s racism.”).
254
See Elise C. Boddie, The Indignities of Color Blindness, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE
64, 71 n.26 (2016) (“[T]he diversity rationale in higher education admissions . . . is rooted in
First Amendment freedoms.”); Feingold, supra note 232, at 115 (“To attain a robust
marketplace of ideas, a university must admit individuals with different experiences and
viewpoints.”).
255
Moreover, this dominant framing tends to value difference for difference’s sake, a
position that can blur any meaningful distinction “between those who would #TakeAKnee to
honor Black lives and those who travel the college circuit to mock, demean, and insult.”
Feingold, supra note 252, at 14.
256
See Feingold, supra note 232, at 66.
257
For a comprehensive overview of this argument, see Feingold, supra note 232, at 75
(reviewing social identity threat and stereotype threat literature); Erman & Walton, supra note
218 (describing role of stereotype threat in antidiscrimination law); Anastasia M. Boles,
Valuing the “Race Card”: Teaching Employment Discrimination Using Culturally Proficient
Instruction, 44 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 25, 26 n.5 (2019).
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Identifying racial diversity as a predicate to racial equality serves two
purposes. First, it leverages existing doctrine (that is, the diversity rationale) to
illuminate often unseen manifestations of racial (dis)advantage ubiquitous
across university settings. Second, it fortifies the case for diversity by mooring
an existing rationale to a more compelling legal, empirical, and normative
anchor.258
Diversity’s equality function is not absent from doctrine. The related concept
of critical mass entered the Supreme Court’s lexicon in Grutter.259 Invoking
testimony from university administrators, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
embraced the notion that racial representation (or “critical mass”) reduces racial
isolation, tokenism, and the negative effects that flow therefrom.260 In Fisher v.
University of Texas,261 Justice Anthony Kennedy cited similar reasoning to
support the University of Texas’s (“UT”) race-conscious admissions program.262
Harvard and UNC recognize that racial representation shapes students’
experiences. But consistent with their broader defenses, the universities hardly
highlight the relationship between racial diversity and racial equality on campus.
As one example, the defendants fail to emphasize the following dynamic:
(1) “colorblind” admissions policies advantage applicants with the most raceand class-based privilege (i.e., wealthy white students); (2) this predictably
yields a student body where wealthy white students are overrepresented;263 and
(3) the ensuing lack of racial diversity contributes to an institutional setting
where students of color are more likely to experience racial stigma and hostility.
This is the backdrop against which affirmative action intervenes. By
mitigating severe racial disparities, race-conscious admissions promote learning
environments where all students, regardless of race, can enjoy the full benefits
of university membership.264 Put differently, affirmative action promotes
equality during admissions (by countering white racial advantage) and after
admissions (by fostering more equitable educational environments).
To better appreciate how university defendants have failed to surface these
dynamics, consider an exchange between Chief Justice John Roberts and UT’s

258

See Feingold, supra note 232.
539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003) (discussing goal of reaching critical mass to reach diversity
objectives); Feingold, supra note 232, at 70 (describing Grutter’s invocation of critical mass).
260
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 308 (arguing that function of critical mass was to
ensure that benefits of diversity were fully realized); Feingold, supra note 232.
261
579 U.S. 365 (2016).
262
579 U.S. 365, 384 (2016) (citing evidence that “minority students admitted under [raceneutral admissions] regime experienced feelings of loneliness and isolation”).
263
In recent years, extreme examples have garnered national attention. See Drake Pooley,
Opinion, Why Has Black Enrollment Fallen at an Elite Southern University, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/opinion/auburn-university-blackstudents.html (describing instances of racial prejudice).
264
Universities could, for example, link diversity’s equality function to Title VI
obligations to prevent a racially hostile learning environment.
259
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attorney in Fisher v. University of Texas.265 During oral argument, the Chief
Justice posed the following question: “What unique perspective does a minority
student bring to a physics class?”266 UT’s counsel dodged the question.267 This
nonresponse did not prove fatal—at least not for UT.268 Still, UT missed an
opportunity to fortify the case for diversity and affirmative action more broadly.
If Harvard and UNC receive a similar question, they should do better. They
might start by invoking Rachel Godsil, who argued that UT should have
highlighted diversity’s equality function.269 Specifically, Godsil urged advocates
to defend racial diversity as necessary, even in physics, to “create an
environment in which all students can perform to their capacity through the
reduction of stereotypes, racial anxiety, and racial isolation.”270 In fact, racial
diversity may matter most in classes like physics—that is, “disciplines and
domains in which negative stereotypes hold a stronger historical significance
and contemporary salience.”271
Now before the Supreme Court, Harvard and UNC can draw on decades of
scholarship that demonstrate the positive correlation between racial diversity
and racial equality.272 But they need not be limited to this body of research.
Universities enjoy access to a unique and local “data set” that can buttress the
empirical scholarship: their own students. Unfortunately, university defendants
tend to overlook—if not minimize and marginalize—the experiences of students
on their campus. This dynamic has unfolded in both cases.273 Rather than center
the voices and experiences of their students, Harvard and UNC have fought to
exclude that testimony and perspective from the litigation.274 Fortunately, courts
in both cases permitted student intervenors to thicken the factual record with
their personal accounts of campus life. Those stories are critical. Beyond
strengthening the case for affirmative action, the testimony illuminates an
unassailable yet contested reality: race continues to matter on university
campuses, and affirmative action offers one tool to make that less so.

265

579 U.S. 365. Fisher v. University of Texas is the most recent race-conscious
admissions challenge to reach the Supreme Court.
266
Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 579 U.S. 365 (2016) (No.
14-00981).
267
Id. at 55-56.
268
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 579 U.S. 365, 376 (2016) (upholding constitutionality of
UT’s race-conscious admissions policy).
269
Godsil, supra note 251, at 62-63 (2016).
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
See Feingold, supra note 226, at 106.
273
See Cheryl I. Harris, What the Supreme Court Did Not Hear in Grutter and Gratz, 51
DRAKE L. REV. 697, 697 (2003).
274
See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 319 F.R.D. 490, 493 (M.D.N.C.
2017) (“SFFA and UNC oppose intervention and argue that Proposed Intervenors should be
allowed to participate as amicus curiae.”).
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B.

The Rebrand: Affirmative Action as Affirmative Obligation
Above, I explored how race matters before, during, and after admissions. The
goal was to (1) add depth and texture to the structuralist insight that facial
neutrality does not ensure racial neutrality, (2) reveal how affirmative action
advocates often defend their own policies in colorblind terms, (3) offer a
roadmap for advocates to champion affirmative action as essential
antidiscrimination—a countermeasure that mitigates an array of racial
(dis)advantages embedded in standard admissions processes.
Next, I take the argument one step further. If affirmative action comprises
essential antidiscrimination, it suggests that universities do not just enjoy a right
to consider applicant race. They might, in fact, possess an obligation to do so.
To unpack this reframe, I turn to two final points of analysis: Title VI’s disparate
impact regulations and the tiers of scrutiny that govern equal protection
challenges.
1. Title VI Disparate Impact Regulations
Universities rarely argue that affirmative action is required. Yet, the UNC
student-intervenors made this argument to justify their involvement in the
litigation. Specifically, the intervenors argued that UNC was unlikely to develop
evidence or otherwise argue “that the current admissions process is necessary to
comply with minority students’ rights under the Constitution and Title VI.”275
The proposition that a university could have an obligation to employ raceconscious admissions relies upon multiple sources of law.276 One source is Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits covered entities from
discriminating against students on the basis of race.277 Consistent with its
broader equality-based jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has read a
discriminatory “intent” requirement into Title VI. This judicial narrowing of
Title VI’s antidiscrimination provision constrains the statute’s remedial efficacy.
It does not, however, displace the disparate impact provision in Title VI’s
implementing regulations.278 From the perspective of affirmative action
advocates, the Title VI regulations can serve two related purposes. First, the

275
Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion to
Intervene at 14, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 319 F.R.D. 490
(M.D.N.C. 2017) (No. 1:14-cv-00954).
276
See, e.g., Luke Charles Harris, Reimagining Regents v. Bakke, in CRITICAL RACE
JUDGMENTS 246 (2022) (arguing that university’s overreliance on “untrustworthy” measures
of academic potential without countermeasure (e.g., affirmative action) discriminates—in
practice if not law—against Black students).
277
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
278
See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (prohibiting covered entities from “utiliz[ing] criteria or
methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination
because of their race”); see also William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates Buildin-Headwinds: An Educational and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 131, 175 (2002).
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regulations offer a mechanism to surface racial (dis)advantage within facially
neutral processes.279 Second, the regulations offer a legal hook to defend raceconscious admissions as mandatory antidiscrimination.280
To establish a prima facie case under Title VI’s implementing regulations, a
plaintiff must show (1) that a covered entity “admitted members of [a] racial
group at a rate that is lower than the admission rate of the racial group admitted
at the highest rate,” and (2) that “the disparity between the difference in rates
meets the judicially determined threshold that triggers the legal requirement that
the university prove the admissions criteria causing the racial disparity in rates
is an ‘educational necessity.’”281
Multiple methods exist for establishing a “judicially determined threshold,”282
one of which is the “four-fifths rule.”283 Kimberly West-Faulcon outlines how
this rule would apply to anti-Asian bias claims:
Applying the four-fifths rule involves determining whether the ratio of the
selection rate for the racial group alleging disparate impact—the group
with the lower selection rate—is less than 80 percent of the selection rate
for the racial group selected at the highest rate. If the ratio of the selection
rate of Asian Americans compared to the rate of selecting whites is less
than 80 percent, a rejected Asian American student would potentially have
evidence of legally cognizable racial adverse impact, also called racially
disparate impact, under established Title VI disparate impact law.284

279
Michael G. Perez, Fair and Facially Neutral Higher Educational Admissions Through
Disparate Impact Analysis, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 467, 467 (2004) (“Enforcing a prohibition
on disparate impact in higher education admissions would force schools to discard or reform
admissions criteria that have an unfair and unnecessary discriminatory effect on minority
applicants.”).
280
The Supreme Court has barred private parties from enforcing Title VI’s implementing
regulations. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (“Neither as originally
enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private
right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602.”). Private parties may still file
administrative complaints with the Department of Education, which is empowered to bring
such claims. See Kidder & Rosner, supra note 278, at 177.
281
West-Faulcon, supra note 150, at 625 n.143. West-Faulcon has offered the most
comprehensive analysis of how a university defendant could operationalize Title VI’s
disparate impact regulations to make an affirmative case for race-conscious admissions and
defuse standard lines of attack. See id.
282
See id. at 616 n.105, 143 and accompanying text; see also Jenkins, supra note 163, at
309-10 (describing similar framework in constitutional context).
283
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2016) (“A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which
is less than four-fifths (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will
generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact,
while a rate greater than four-fifths will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement
agencies as evidence of adverse impact.”).
284
West-Faulcon, supra note 154, at 615 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)).
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University defendants rarely mobilize Title VI’s disparate impact provisions
to defend race-conscious admissions.285 Albeit underutilized, Title VI’s
implementing regulations offer an affirmative action defense. Under certain
facts, a university could establish that race-conscious admissions are necessary
to avoid an unjustifiable disparate impact from unreliable admissions criteria.286
The argument makes multiple interventions. First, it disrupts the presumption
that standard academic indicators are unassailable and race-neutral measures of
“merit.”287 Put differently, the implementing regulations provide an analytical
framework to highlight how ostensibly colorblind assessments (e.g., grades or
standardized tests) artificially inflate the relative qualifications of white
applicants.288
The implementing regulations also offer a path to counter the narrative that
affirmative action harms Asian Americans. West-Faulcon has detailed how UT
could have mobilized such an argument to defuse this narrative in Fisher.289 A
short review is helpful because similar narratives feature in the Harvard
litigation.
UT admitted most of its students through a facially neutral Ten Percent
Plan.290 The remainder of admits (“non-Top Ten”) were admitted through a
process that permitted admissions officers to consider a range of factors.291 One
factor was an applicant’s race—a consideration that was available to any

285

See Kidder & Rosner, supra note 278, at 184-85 (“There is a paucity of Title VI
standardized testing cases challenging college and university admission practices. This may
be a reflection of the availability of affirmative action as a counterbalance to disparate impact,
and it may also reflect a recognition on the part of plaintiffs’ attorneys that Title VI disparate
impact cases are difficult to win and may have even less viability in the future.” (footnotes
omitted)).
286
See id.
287
See Kidder & Rosner, supra note 278, at 193 (explaining why overreliance on
standardized tests would not constitute educational necessity).
288
For deeper critiques of merit, see generally Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan,
Affirmative Action and the Myth of Preferential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the
Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1 (1994); Daria
Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1449
(1997).
289
Fisher featured a white plaintiff. Still, conservative Justices couched their affirmative
action skepticism in a narrative of Asian victimhood. See id. at 2227 n.4 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“The majority’s assertion that UT’s race-based policy does not discriminate against AsianAmerican students . . . defies the laws of mathematics.”).
290
Pursuant to the Ten Percent Plan, all Texas students who graduate in the top 10% of
their high school automatically receive admission to UT. See id. at 2207.
291
See id.
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student.292 Even within this subset of students, UT admitted Black and Latinx
students at rates far lower than white and Asian American applicants.293
As West-Faulcon explains, UT could have marshaled this data to defend
affirmative action on two fronts. First, UT could have argued that the rate
disparities for non-Top Ten applicants exposed the University to liability under
Title VI’s disparate impact provisions.294 The operative question, in turn, should
have been whether UT sufficiently mitigated its overreliance on criteria that
produced an unjustifiable disparate impact—not whether the law permitted UT
to consider race at all.
Separately, UT could have employed the data to counter the narrative that
affirmative action harmed Asian American applicants. UT admitted Asian
American and white non-Top Ten applicants at similar rates—evidence that
undercuts the claims of negative action against Asian Americans.295 More
importantly, white applicants applied in larger numbers and enjoyed higher
admission rates than Black and Latinx applicants. Accordingly, as West-Faulcon
explains, rejected Asian American applicants “were far more likely to have been
displaced by a white applicant than an African American or Latinx applicant.”296
Accordingly, if UT rejected “deserving” Asian American applicants, the
beneficiaries were likely white, not other students of color.
Similar arguments could translate to the Harvard and UNC lawsuits.297 SFFA
has deployed a narrative of Asian victimhood to scapegoat and stigmatize
affirmative action—even as its own expert identifies white students as the
primary beneficiaries of the alleged anti-Asian bias.298 Harvard could invoke
Title VI’s implementing regulations to highlight this dynamic, which calls for
more (racially targeted) affirmative action, not less.
Harvard has failed to do so, even as SFFA identifies evidence of white racial
advantage:

292

See id. (“[T]here is no dispute that race is but a ‘factor of a factor of a factor’ in the
holistic-review calculus.”).
293
See West-Faulcon, supra note 154, at 615 (“Both the white and Asian American
admission rates were more than double the rates for Latino and African American students,
statistically favoring white and Asian American applicants over African Americans and
Latinos, not vice versa.”).
294
See id.
295
Statistics that aggregate the experiences of all Asian American students are likely to
obscure meaningful differences across different Asian ethnic groups. See generally Vinay
Harpalani, Asian Americans, Racial Stereotypes, and Elite University Admissions, 102 B.U.
L. REV. 101 (2022). Accordingly, average “Asian” performance masks (1) the group-based
disadvantage that certain communities continue to face and (2) why affirmative action
benefits certain Asian American students. See West-Faulcon, supra note 154, at 613.
296
West-Faulcon, supra note 154, at 613.
297
See id. at 625 (explaining that Title VI analysis could dispel narrative of “African
Americans and Latinos . . . not whites, as the students who are edging out Asian Americans”).
298
Id. at 613.
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[Harvard’s Office of Institutional Research] found that Asian-American
admit rates were lower than white admit rates every year over a ten-year
period even though . . . white applicants materially outperformed AsianAmerican applicants only in the personal rating. Indeed, [the Office of
Institutional Research] found that the white applicants were admitted at a
higher rate than their Asian-American counterparts at every level of
academic-index level.299
Harvard could have cited this report to buttress the broader claim that even
under the university’s current affirmative action policy, white students enjoy
racial advantages. Instead, Harvard discounted the report’s factual and legal
relevance.300 One might justify Harvard’s rebuttal as a rational response to
potential evidence of discrimination. That explanation, however, misconstrues
the report’s relevance vis-à-vis affirmative action. Even if provisional, the report
suggests that white applicants enjoy unmerited racial advantages in admissions
relative to Asian Americans. It also exculpates affirmative action as the source
of any anti-Asian bias.
Similar reasoning extends to UNC’s admissions regime. SFFA’s complaint
contains a table of admissions rates for Black, white, and Asian American
students.301 The table divides students into nine “academic index ranges.”302 In
seven of the nine ranges, white applicants enjoy a higher admission rate than
Asian Americans—most of which surpass the four-fifths threshold.303 In its
posttrial brief, SFFA highlighted an academic decile where “[t]he white admit
rate is 2.9 percent. The Asian American admit rate is 1.4 percent; and then you

299
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Reasons in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment
at 13, SFFA v. Harvard I, 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass 2019), aff’d, 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir.
2020), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022) (No. 1:14-cv-14176) (citations omitted). This
statement tracks additional allegations from SFFA that Harvard prefers white applicants to
Asian applicants with similar academic credentials. See, e.g., id. at 10 (noting that individual
Asian American male applicant with 25% chance of admission would have 31.7% chance of
admission if he were white and that, on average, approximately 44% more Asian American
applicants would be admitted each year if they were white).
300
I am not suggesting that the report proves discrimination, however defined. Rather, I
highlight this evidence because Harvard diminished a report that could have bolstered a
colorconscious account of race and the case for more affirmative action for Asian applicants.
301
See Complaint at 18, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 319 F.R.D.
490 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (No. 1:14-cv-00954). UNC generated the statistics in 2006. SFFA
employs the table to malign affirmative action, not to target the advantage white students
enjoy vis-à-vis Asian applicants.
302
These indices correspond to the students’ SAT scores and undergraduate GPA. SFFA
divides students in this way to calculate the purported “boost” students receive from
affirmative action. But, as others have noted, this method distorts the admissions process—
and overstates affirmative action’s impact—by treating academic performance as the only
admissions criteria. See West-Faulcon, supra note 154, at 601-05.
303
See id.
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see for African Americans, it’s 39.6 percent; and for Hispanics, it’s almost 16
percent.”304
SFFA deploys these misleading figures to implicate affirmative action as the
source of anti-Asian discrimination in admissions.305 UNC, however, need not
avoid the evidence. To the contrary, it could emphasize that white applicants
enjoy higher admissions rates relative to their Asian American counterparts.
Doing so disrupts SFFA’s causal claim that affirmative action harms Asian
Americans and implicates the racial advantages that white students continue to
enjoy—even under a race-conscious admissions regime. By reappropriating the
data, stakeholders can reclaim affirmative action as modest—if insufficient—
antidiscrimination and, ideally, advocate for more refined and targeted raceconscious programs.
2. Contesting Strict Scrutiny
A Colorconscious Story invites a final intervention: challenge the Supreme
Court’s decision to subject both Jim Crow segregation and affirmative action to
strict scrutiny—the most rigorous level of judicial review. On this point, Devon
Carbado has offered the following observation:
A final reason a countermeasure framing of affirmative might be important
is that this framing would make the application of strict scrutiny to
affirmative action normatively and doctrinally suspect. Which is to say, it
is much easier for opponents of affirmative action to argue that the policy
triggers strict scrutiny when affirmative action is conceptualized as a
preference than it would be if affirmative action were viewed as a
countermeasure.306
As Carbado notes, judicial skepticism toward race-conscious admissions
trades on the presumption that affirmative action confers a “racial preference.”
That skepticism is misplaced to the extent affirmative action mitigates racial
(dis)advantages that benefit white applicants. For affirmative action advocates,
evading colorblind capture leads here: an unbashful critique of doctrinal regimes
that constitutionalize an equivalence between segregation and desegregation,
subordination and remediation, exclusion and inclusion.
This critique of existing doctrine will not sway the current Supreme Court.
But that reality renders the critique no less important. Affirmative action
304

Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 29, Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 319 F.R.D. 490 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (No. 1:14-cv-00954).
305
Similar tables tend to overstate affirmative action’s impact for at least two reasons.
First, the tables employ analyses that disregard multiple admissions considerations. Second,
when a university employs affirmative action to reduce overreliance on fraught standardized
test scores, Black and Latinx students are likely to enjoy higher median rates of admission
when controlling for test scores. Separately, the figures reveal what universities already admit:
they consider applicant race. See Feingold, supra note 153, at 724; see also West-Faulcon,
supra note 154, at 627.
306
Carbado, supra note 20, at 1123.
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litigation remains a proxy for broader fights over the enduring relevance of race
and racism in America, and of what, if anything, remains necessary to repair a
legacy of racialized subordination and oppression. Today, these larger battles
could not be more acute. Given resurgent attacks targeting antiracism writ large,
university defendants bear a heightened responsibility to reclaim their policies’
moral and constitutional authority. Part of that work entails targeting the
colorblind logic that underwrites existing doctrine and informs regressive
projects that cast antiracism as the new racism.
This is a space where the Left could learn from the Right. The current moment
of racial retrenchment is facilitated by an ultraconservative Supreme Court
majority.307 But it is also enabled by a decades-long project that has seeded the
colorblind conceptions of race and racism that now pervade constitutional
discourse and public consciousness.
At least since Bakke, university defendants have acquiesced to a doctrinal
framework that equates affirmative action with such ignoble policies as de jure
segregation and Japanese interment.308 By failing to contest strict scrutiny’s
application to remedial race-consciousness, affirmative action advocates have
weakened their own case. To appreciate why, imagine if the Supreme Court
included five liberal Justices. Harvard and UNC would prevail in the present
litigation, but based on a finding that the challenged policies satisfy strict
scrutiny. Even in upholding race-conscious admissions, the Court would reify
colorblind logics that render affirmative action presumptively suspect and
vulnerable to political, moral, and constitutional attacks.309
This acquiescence is neither inevitable nor strategic. Consider SFFA, which
has deployed a multipronged front that challenges Harvard and UNC’s
admissions policies under existing law and seeks to overturn existing law.310
Specifically, SFFA asks the Supreme Court to reject the diversity rationale and
overturn Grutter, which SFFA casts as inconsistent with the spirit and mandate
of Brown v. Board of Education. Even more radically, SFFA invites the Court
to prohibit all race-conscious considerations, regardless of the rationale, and to
ban universities from even knowing the race of their applicants.311
Even if SFFA does not prevail on every point, it has expanded the possibilities
of regressive lawmaking. This contrasts with the university defendants, whose
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acquiescence to existing doctrine circumscribes the grounds for even poignant
dissents. Moreover, SFFA recognizes that its audience transcends the Supreme
Court. SFFA is addressing the public. The narrative SFFA has constructed
within the confines of litigation does more than further the organization’s legal
claims. It also tracks, amplifies, and reinforces an ongoing campaign to sew
colorblindness so deeply into our cultural consciousness that we can no longer
distinguish racism from antiracism.
CONCLUSION
This Article has located contemporary affirmative action disputes within
longstanding efforts to defuse the transformative potential of antiracist reform.
In a way, this connection is obvious: race-conscious admissions offer a modest
antiracist practice. Accordingly, these policies are a natural target of regressive
backlash. But the connection runs deeper. Fights over affirmative action
implicate far more than any given practice or set of practices. Affirmative action
debates serve as a proxy for larger and more fundamental contestations over
what, if anything, America must do to overcome its racial past. These fights, in
other words, are where litigants, judges, and the public debate whether a racial
status quo—defined by searing inequalities—is constitutionally acceptable and
morally just.
We might expect affirmative action litigation to feature competing visions of
race and racism in America. And we might expect affirmative action advocates
to wield a structuralist story that combats the colorblind logic that animates antiaffirmative action talking points. But this is not what we see. Instead, we
encounter an adversarial space in which both sides—Left and Right, advocate
and opponent—espouse thin theories of race and racism that, at best, offer
lukewarm support for modest race-conscious interventions.
This reality reveals that the Right has never enjoyed a monopoly on
colorblindness. For decades, colorblindness—and the conceptual pillars on
which it rests—has infused liberal defenses of affirmative action. This trend
shows no signs of subsiding. For those determined to withstand multiple
coalescing waves of racial retrenchment, this should be cause for concern. But
it also reveals an opportunity. Even if race-conscious admissions are lost in the
court of law, this is a moment to revive the case for affirmative action in the
court of public opinion. The moment calls for nothing less.

